

Ethical altruistic voting in a multi-ethnic developing country. Evidence from Ethiopia.

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March 2006

Abstract

Referring to Aristotle's "Politics", we define "ethical altruistic voting" in a multi-ethnic developing country as the individual's renouncement of voting for an ethnic party that will favour his ethnic group at the expense of all others regarding public good allocation, so as to promote instead an "Ethiopia-oriented" party struggling for an equitable allocation of public good among ethnic groups. Ethical altruistic voting may thus be considered as a way of preventing internal conflicts from emerging in the political community, and of creating instead a state of concord potentially favouring economic growth and poverty reduction.

In this paper, we investigate whether "ethical altruistic voting" exists in such a framework, by focusing on Ethiopian politics where ethnicity has been widely politicized over the last decade by the Tigray-based ruling party EPRDF. We exploit the results of a questionnaire submitted for that purpose to 331 students from the Addis Ababa University in May 2004. Respondents' political preferences are revealed through an "approval voting" question and a "voting" question.

We implement a three-step analysis.

We first address the complex issue of ethnicity in Ethiopia by highlighting how it has been manipulated by the current political elite to implement a "divide and rule" strategy.

We then model a utility function showing individuals' trade-off between egoism and ethical altruism and predict, according to the degree of ethical altruism, the results of both the "approval voting" and the "voting" questions.

We finally test these predictions by relying on a probit analysis after having made sure that our understanding of the Ethiopian political landscape coincides with the students' one.

Our results not only demonstrate the existence of ethical altruistic voting, but also its strong impact on individuals' vote. Indeed, we show that being an ethical altruist decreases the probability of voting for ethnicity-oriented parties rather than for Ethiopia-oriented parties by almost one half, and more fundamentally reverses the outcome of people's vote compared to the case where they are egoists.

In this setting, the resounding victory of CUD, a newly-formed coalition of "Ethiopia-oriented" opposition parties that won 20 out of 23 seats dedicated to Addis Ababa at the House of People's Representatives during last May 2005 national elections, may partly illustrate ethical altruistic voting behaviours on the part of Ethiopian citizens.

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Key words: Aristotle, Common Good, discriminatory politics, ethical altruism, Ethiopia, ethnic federalism, ethnicity, public good, voting behaviour

JEL code: D02, D63, D64, D72, H41, H72, H77, J15, N47, O55, Z13

1 Introduction

In *Politics*, Aristotle defines common good as the state of "good life" (I, 1) or "self-sufficiency" achieved by a community that, once this stage reached, truly deserves the name of "state or political community" (I, 1): "when several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life"(I, 2). In this context, as recalled by Smith (1999 and 2000) and Terchek and Moore (2000), the "good life" is to be understood not only in a material (the "poiesis" component) but also in an ethical sense (the "praxis" component): "Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a husbandman, another a shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thousand: nevertheless, if they have nothing in common but exchange, alliance and the like, that would not constitute a state. (...) virtue must be the care of a state which is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name: for without this end the community becomes a mere alliance which differs only in place from alliance of which the members live apart" (III, 9).

Common good can thus be described as the situation of a materially self-sufficient political community that is administered according to "virtue" also described as "justice" by Aristotle. Indeed, living according to virtue is supposed to endow individuals with happiness. Moreover, by favoring consensus among them, a just administration tempers conflicts between various interest groups living in the community, thus ensuring harmony within the state, and potentially creating the necessary trust and cooperation level between people to trigger off growth and poverty reduction.

Yet, in a democracy, the fundamental rules of the game of the political community are defined by citizens through voting. Among these rules, two have been widely studied by researchers in political economy: the tax level necessary to finance a public good (see the seminal works of Romer (1975), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard(1981)) and the allocation of a public good among citizens that has been addressed by economic models dedicated to "special-interest politics" (Persson and Tabellini (2000))¹.

For the common good to be reached, citizens must thus show virtue through voting by electing the fair solution likely to defuse conflicts between interest groups regarding each of these two main dimensions. In this setting, virtuous citizens may be considered as the guarantors for happiness in the state since they prevent civil war from interfering among them (see Valfort, 2005a)². Following virtue may particularly imply that citizens be "ethical altruists" whenever virtue requires sacrifice on their part. We define *altruism* as *the individual's renouncement of his self-interest whenever he undertakes actions likely to influence others' well-being*.

¹See legislative bargaining models (Baron and Ferejohn (1989)) or lobbying models (Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Persson (1998)).

²The close relation between virtue and happiness is often reasserted by Aristotle: "the happy life is the life according to virtue" (I, 11). One should bear in mind that happiness in this setting not only refers to the state of harmony between virtuous citizens but also to the personal delight one feels when he behaves virtuously.

However, each of the two dimensions which are tax level and public good allocation are not necessarily relevant for research in all democratic contexts. In the case of a developing country for instance, only the public good allocation issue seems to deserve interest since public goods in this context are less financed by the tax system (which is usually highly inefficient) than by customs dues and financial aid granted by foreign backers.

In this paper, we concentrate on the case of developing countries and thus focus on citizens' altruism when they vote for a fair public good allocation rule. However, in order to define the fair rule likely to solve conflicts between interest groups struggling around the public good allocation issue, we must first identify such interest groups.

Conflicts regarding public good allocation are likely to occur between two types of groups: the first group gathers people who, according to Aristotle³, consider themselves as "well-born" (IV, 13) and instrumentalise this supposedly "good birth" (IV, 8) to claim for a greater share of the public good compared to the rest of the population; the other groups are nothing but the rest of the population since they encompass all those considered as "meanly-born" (IV, 13) by the allegedly "well-born". Discriminated by the former in terms of access to public good, the resentful "meanly born" try in turn to found a "good birth" myth so as to make public good allocation also potentially profitable to them.

This competition for "good birth" is thus the source of endless dissensions among interest groups within the political community, considerably undermining its chance to reach common good.

Such conflicts are particularly vivid in multi-ethnic countries (see Easterly and Levine (1997) on the economic adverse consequences of ethnic fractionalisation). Indeed, a simple and minimalist definition of ethnicity proposed by Levine (1999) defines ethnicity as a "method of classifying people (...) that uses origin (socially constructed) as its primary reference". Ethnicity is thus what unifies people objectively sharing a common "birth": this is the so-called "primordialist" approach to ethnicity widely adopted by anthropologists.

But ethnicity is also consequently what potentially enables people from one ethnic group to organize themselves, often under the influence of political elite struggling for power, so as to make this common birth equivalent to a "good birth"⁴ and thus justify that they get a greater share of the public good compared to what accrues to other ethnic groups. This strategy stands for the so-called "instrumentalist" approach to ethnicity that Nabudere (1999) describes as a "class manipulation and mobilisation of the ethnic sentiments for purely narrow and self-serving interests".

Yet, the instrumentalisation of "birth" justifying a discriminatory allocation of public good is clearly not acceptable since it obviously violates the principle of equality among human beings whatever their origin that constitutes an imprescriptible natural right.

This imprescriptibility argument is notably backed according to Aristotle by the impossibility of assimilating "good birth" with "virtue"⁵ and more exten-

³Aristotle originally highlights the "good birth" criterion as an argument put forward by "well-born" to justify their exclusive access to government.

⁴Berman (1998) refers to this manipulation as "a work of intellectual construction, an imagining or invention of a common history, language and culture, typically expressed in oral or written texts combining and reworking both old and new elements".

⁵If virtue and good birth were perfectly comparable, this could perhaps justify that an exogenously financed public good be allocated to virtuous people on a more advantageous way.

sively with any kind of merit: "good birth and virtue are rare" (V, 1). Aristotle illustrates this impossibility through two remarks. The first one highlights that good birth is not hereditary: "They think that as men and animals beget men and animals, so from good men a good man springs. But this is what nature, though she may intend it, cannot always accomplish" (I, 7). The second one stresses that "good birth" is a very vague notion that prompts each group of individuals sharing common characteristics to forge their "good birth" myth and therefore renders the attempt to assimilate "good birth" with virtue even more impossible and dangerous: "Hellenes regard themselves as noble everywhere and not only in their own country, but they deem the barbarians noble only when at home, thereby implying that there are two sorts of nobility and freedom, the one absolute, the other relative" (I, 6).

Ethical altruistic voting as regarding public good allocation in a multi-ethnic developing country will thus consist in the individual's renouncement of voting for an ethnic party that will favour his ethnic group at the expense of all others regarding public good allocation, so as to promote instead an "Ethiopia-oriented" party struggling for an equitable allocation of public good among ethnic groups. This may require, as we will show, strong altruism specially in contexts where elites instrumentalize ethnicity to get a better access to power and then maintain it.

In this paper, we investigate whether "ethical altruistic voting" exists in such a framework, by focusing on Ethiopian politics where ethnicity has been widely politicized over the last decade by the Tigray-based ruling party EPRDF. We exploit the results of a questionnaire submitted for that purpose to 331 students from the Addis Ababa University in May 2004 (May, 8-9)⁶. Respondents' political preferences are revealed through an "approval voting" question and a "voting" question.

The students were recruited thanks to a research assistant. They come from various faculties of the Addis Ababa University: 39.6% from the department of Business/Management, 19.6% from the department of Science, 13.3% from the department of Economics, the remainder (27% of the 329 students who answered the "faculty question") gathering students from the Law, Political Science and International Relations, Technology faculties...etc. The sample gathers graduate and undergraduate students enrolled both in the "regular" and the "extension" programs.

Among the 323 students who answered the "age" question, the average age is 23.3 with a minimum age of 18 (the age of eligibility in Ethiopia) and a maximum age of 42⁷.

Our "democracy and voting" questionnaire constituted the first part of the survey (the second⁸ and third parts⁹ of the survey were totally independent of ours and were designed and conducted by Peter Martinsson from Gothenburg University (Sweden)). We ran 6 sessions of 50 to 60 students at a single point in time so as to avoid contamination. Each session consisted of the three parts, where each part had to be finished by all respondents before proceeding to the next one. Each student was paid 30 Birrs (roughly 3 Euros) for showing up, knowing that, according to the 1997 urban household survey reported by Bigsten and al. (2005), 70% of Addis Ababa households earn less than 600 Birrs per month -roughly less than 20 Birrs per day. This rather large amount was

⁶See Valfort (2005b) to access survey's content and related statistics (<http://ceco.polytechnique.fr/fichiers/ceco/publications/pdf/2005-04-04-281.pdf>).

⁷14.2% of these 323 students are between 18 and 20, 64.1% are between 21 and 24, 16.1% are between 25 and 29, and 5.6% are above 30.

⁸The second part was a questionnaire on "trust" and "health care priority".

⁹The third part consisted in a dictator game and a public good experiment.

necessary since the survey was lengthy and conducted over a week-end.

We must here underline that university students constitute a very "special" group and cannot be considered as representative of the Ethiopian population. However, politics being a very sensitive topic in Ethiopia, it wouldn't have been possible to run this survey among a sample of urban or rural households. This work may nevertheless be considered as providing a useful framework for further research aiming at testing our predictions on more representative samples in a sub-Saharan democracy ready for such field experiments.

We implement a three-step analysis.

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We then model a utility function showing individuals' trade-off between egoism and ethical altruism and predict, according to the degree of ethical altruism, the results of both the "approval voting" and the "voting" questions.

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2 Ethnicity in Ethiopia

Since the anthropologist Carlo Conti-Rossini's 1937 comparison of Ethiopia with "un museo di populi", Ethiopia has been considered as a country of ethnic diversity.

This ethnic diversity was for the first time officially acknowledged in July 1991 during a transitional Conference held by the forces of the Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (EPRDF) that drove Mengistu's military regime out of power in May of the same year.

This Charter introduced the "right to self determination"¹⁰ prefiguring the reordering of the Ethiopian State along ethnic lines. This ethnic-based federalism was endorsed by a Constitution ratified in December 1994 that formalized the division of the country into 9 federal states "delimited on the basis of settlement patterns, identity, language and the consent of the people concerned" (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Constitution, 1994: Art. 46-47) and 2 special administrative zones.

2.1 Ethiopian major ethnic groups: between historical unification and division

The breakdown of the Ethiopian population along ethnic federal states and special administrative zones as estimated for 2005 is recorded in Table 1.

¹⁰The right to self-determination is defined by the Transitional Charter in three steps: "the right a) to preserve its identity and have it respected, promote its culture and history, and use and develop its language; b) to administer its own affairs within its own defined territory and effectively participate in the central government on the basis of freedom, and fair and proper representation; c) to exercise its right to self-determination of independence, when the concerned nation/nationality and people is convinced that the above rights are denied, abridged, or abrogated." (Transitional Conference, 1991: Part One, Article Two).

	2005 estimates	%
9 ethnic federal states		
Afar state	1,454,366	2.06
Amhara region state	18,185,502	25.76
Beni-Shangul/Gumuz state	0,605,284	0.86
Gambella state	0,239,062	0.34
Harari state	0,172,385	0.24
Oromia	24,624,336	34.88
Somali state	4,447,248	6.30
SNNPR*	13,640,842	19.32
Tigray	4,122,696	5.84
Sub-total	67,491,721	95.60
2 special administrative zones		
Addis Ababa	2,777,241	3.93
Dire Dawa	0,331,081	0.47
Sub-total	3,108,322	4.40
TOTAL	70,600,043	100.00
Source: World Gazetteer, estimates for 2005 (we added percentage calculation)		
*Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region		

Table 1: Population of Ethiopia by ethnic federal state and administrative zone (2005 estimates)

We focus in the following on the three largest ethnic groups encompassing almost 80% of the Ethiopian population. They are *Oromos* (living in Oromia), *Amharas* and *SNNPs* (Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples). We also integrate *Tigreans* (living in Tigray) into our analysis due to their major role in Ethiopian politics. Indeed, the currently ruling party EPRDF is a coalition of ethnic-based parties dominated by the Tigrayan party TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front)¹¹.

Table 2 reports the breakdown of the 331 students of our sample along ethnic lines, by using the father's ethnicity of the respondent due to the patriarchal organisation of the Ethiopian society. Indeed, Giorgis (2002) contends: "many women are considered and treated as inferior in the family and mistreated by their husbands and male partners. They suffer injustice and maltreatment by various agents and mechanisms -such as tradition, culture, religion, justice administration bodies, police, prosecutors, judges and family arbitration tribunals". Under such settings, Wright (2000) explains that "a woman who marries a man from another ethnic group will adopt his identity (...). A man, however, does not become part of his wife's group". This particularly suggests that children's ethnicity is determined by their father's one in Ethiopia. It may however be that female respondents whose parents belong to different ethnic groups feel closer to the ethnic group of their mother rather than to the ethnic group of their father, as a reaction to this male chauvinistic rule of determining each person's ethnicity. Yet, among the 329 respondents who answered the "gender" question, females having parents from different ethnic groups stand for only 3.6%¹². In such conditions, even if this reaction exists, it shouldn't compromise our decision to derive respondents' ethnicity from their father's one.

¹¹See Figure VII.1. in appendix for a geographic situation of the Ethiopian federal states and administrative zones.

¹²Females are largely under-represented and stand for only 11.2% of the 329 respondents.

	Number	%
Oromo	69	20.8
Amhara	130	39.3
Tigray	88	26.6
SNNPs, among which	39	11.8
<i>Gurage</i>	24	7.3
<i>Other SNNPs</i>	15	4.5
Agew	1	0.3
Amh/Oro*	1	0.3
Missing	3	0.9
TOTAL	331	100.0

*the respondent claimed to be "half Oromo and half Amhara"

Table 2: Breakdown of the 331 students according to father's ethnicity

Focussing henceforth on Amharas, Oromos, SNNPs and Tigreans, we get a sample gathering 326 observations (from the 331 initially mentioned).

2.1.1 Origins: the "primordialist" approach

Levine (1974) goes back to the third millennium B. C. to define a primordial differentiation criterion (that of language) between inhabitants of what he calls "Greater Ethiopia" (this circumscribes current Ethiopia and Eritrea) who were the ancestors of Ethiopian current ethnic groups.

At that period, peoples from this area were divided into three Afro-Asiatic linguistic groups, two of them, Semitic¹³ and Cushitic¹⁴, belonging to the Chamito-Semitic language family¹⁵, and the third one, Omotic, constituting an Afro-Asiatic language family in itself.

Around the second millennium B. C. these linguistic groups started to further differentiate along cultural lines, giving rise to five core groups considered as ancestors of the Ethiopian current main ethnic groups which are Amharas, Oromos, Tigreans, and the patchwork of ethnic groups in Southern Ethiopia.

During this evolution, Cushitic speakers split up into three branches among which eastern Cushites who occupied the southern part of the Great Rift Valley in Ethiopia and who are the ancestors of the *Oromo people*.

Semitic speakers divided into two groups: northern semitic speakers who settled in the northern plateau regions and southern semitic speakers who populated the central part of the country. Northern semitic speakers and Southern semitic speakers are the ancestors of *Tigray and Amhara people* respectively.

Omotic speakers settled in the southwest and diversified into around fifty communities with distinct language and cultures. They are the ancestors of a large number of tribes and ethnic groups forming the *ethnic patchwork of southern Ethiopia*.

2.1.2 A history of unification (10th century-19th century A. D.)

Aksum kingdom, the first Ethiopian political center whose inhabitants were ancestors of Tigreans, is considered as the original nucleus of the Ethiopian unification process and the source of the Tigrayan (and to some extent northern Ethiopian) "good birth" myth¹⁶. It flourished from the 1st to the 6th century

¹³Semitic languages are formed, among others, by Arabic, Hebrew, Aramean, Amharic, and Akkadian languages (the language spoken in ancient Mesopotamia by the Assyrians and Babylonians and using the cuneiform writing system).

¹⁴Cushitic languages are those currently spoken in Ethiopian and Somalian regions.

¹⁵This language family encompasses five linguistic branches: Berber, Cushitic, Egyptian, Semitic, and Chadian languages.

¹⁶The greatness of the Aksumite power is still particularly vivid in the Tigrayan consciousness, largely thanks to the *Kebre Negest*, a literary script written by Tigrayan monks, that

and continued to play a significant role in northern Ethiopia until the 10th century.

From this original nucleus, Levine (1974) defends the view of a three-step unification process of Ethiopian ethnic groups, organized as follows: the "Amhara thesis", the "Oromo antithesis" and the "Ethiopian synthesis"¹⁷.

The "Amhara thesis" (10th century-16th century) After the invasion of Aksum in the 970s by the Arab Muslims' invasions, a post-Aksumite kingdom was created in the Amhara province, inheriting the Solomonid Dynasty (it claimed descent from the ancient rulers of Aksum and beyond that from King Salomon and the Queen of Sheba). During the 14th and 15th centuries, the Amhara sphere of influence through language, religion (Monophysite Christianity), moral values and political style expanded considerably southwardly. However, in the early 16th, Solomonid dynasty was weakened by a series of invasions by East Cushitic people from the south.

The "Oromo antithesis" (16th-18th century) Levine (1974) presents these invasions as "the assertion of a pagan, purely African force" searching for new land to settle a rapidly growing population. Since they weren't motivated by the extension of an Oromo empire that did not exist (Oromo people were a juxtaposition of independent and often competing tribes), Oromos tended to adapt themselves to the way of life of "conquered" populations. For Levine (1974), "the story of the various accommodations between the Galla¹⁸ and the other peoples of Greater Ethiopia is the story of the making of modern Ethiopian society".

The "Ethiopian synthesis" (18th century-19th century) The Ethiopian synthesis that contributed to the setting of Greater Ethiopia as a political entity occurred through two processes.

The first one is the constitution of a rather homogenous Oromo land in southern Ethiopia with Oromo acculturation to existing communities in the southeast populated by Somali and in the southwest populated by Gurage and Sidamo ethnic groups.

The second process is the unification between southern and northern Ethiopia, between Oromos and Amharas thanks to a local dynasty of Amhara rulers that led steady reconquest of Shoa province throughout the 18th and 19th century. This ended in a complete acculturation of Oromos who were settled in the Shoa province through their massive conversion to Christianity and frequent inter-marriages between Oromos and Amharas. The expansion of Shoa reached its acme under the reign of Menelik II (1889-1913), the founder of Addis Ababa as Ethiopia's main city, with conquest in the south that enabled to triple the size of the Shoa Empire and brought in several dozens of ethnic groups. This gathering of people from diverse language and cultures achieved the unification process and the emergence of Greater Ethiopia at the end of the 19th century.

exalts the Aksumite Kingdom. As analysed by Levine (1974), *Kebre Negest* links the "greatness of [Aksumite] kings" (their "good birth") with three mythological events which are: their descendancy from the elect genealogy of King David that guarantees their filiation from Shem and not Ham; their possession of the Tabernacle (encompassing the Arch of the Covenant) of Zion (believed to be the first city created by God where the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit agreed to create Adam) obtained from the Jews, the initially chosen people (Aksumite people then become the ultimately "elect people" through their concomitant conversion to Christianity); their resistance to the heresy of roman Christianity which, contrary to Ethiopian orthodox Christianity, rejected monophysitism at the Council of Chalcedon in 451 A. D. (as noticed by Levine (1974), Ethiopians then "emerge as the sole authentic bearers of Christianity, the only people in the world now favoured by the God of Salomon").

¹⁷Gudina (2003) refers to Levine's "Hegelian triad".

¹⁸The words "Galla" and "Oromos" are synonymous.

This effective unity was symbolised (and remains as such in Ethiopian memory) by the successful solidarity movement that led Oromo troupes to fight side by side with Amharas and Tigreans against the Italian invader, paving the way to the Adua victory in 1889.

However, many have doubts towards the relevancy of considering the unification process during the 18th and 19th centuries as truly embodying an "Ethiopian synthesis". Indeed, the "empire-state building" process through the expansion of the Amhara Shoa region was less a "nation building process" than a process of domination with the Amhara elite imposing their language, culture and, in certain cases, their religion to "conquered" peoples from the south. This was further accentuated during the 20th century under Hailé Sélassié's regime (1916-1974) which triggered off large resentment on the part of dominated ethnic groups.

2.1.3 A history of division

Amharas have been perceived as pure dominators by Tigreans, Oromos, and the patchwork of southern ethnic groups during all the 19th and a large part of the 20th century.

Tigreans, who had lost their past glory, had a vivid bitterness against them which they considered as impure: "Tigray was the centre of the ancient Axumite Kingdom, and its inhabitants consider themselves the purest of them, compared to Amhara who mixed with other races" (Markakis (1987)). This was further accentuated when Menelik II disposed the heir of emperor Yohannes (1872-1889), the only Tigray emperor of Abyssinia in modern times, to access power.

Oromos, who had changed their language, culture, religion and even names, felt totally denied despite their large number, as explained by Hassen (1996).

The condition of peoples of the South was even worse. They were subjected both to class and national domination with the instauration of feudal serfdom ("masgabar" in Amharic) and cultural and linguistic domination ("makinat" in Amharic¹⁹) leading Gudina (2003) to qualify this dual oppression as "internal colonialism".

This resentment expressed through sporadic rebellions over the 20th century, culminating in 1960 when factions of the imperial army motivated by the Marxist ideology fomented a coup that failed. However, this failed attempt triggered off the emergence of organized opposition movements against the empire. One of them, the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) theoretized a Marxist position regarding the question of nationalities so as to strengthen grassroots' awareness of the Amhara oppression "genuine Ethiopian" one has to speak Amharic, to listen to Amharic music, to accept the Amhara-Tigre religion, Orthodox Christianity (...). In some cases to be an "Ethiopian", you will even have to change your name. In short, to be an Ethiopian, you will have to wear an Amhara mask (to use Fanon's expression)" (quoted by Balsvik (1985)). The claim for the "right of Ethiopian nations and nationalities to self-determination, including secession" emerged at that period.

The ideology developed by ESM was the main factor leading to the February 1974 revolution that put an end to Haile Selassie's reign. However, contrary to grassroots' great expectations, the 1974 revolution inaugurated a destructive

¹⁹According to Gudina (2003), "makinat" involved evangelisation of the local population, institutionalisation of a new system of political control and imposition of a new political class, culture, and language on the indigenous population. (...) Throughout the imperial period, the elites were advised to take Christian names to be considered as civilized and authentic Ethiopians: the "Gebre-Egizabehers" (slaves of God) and the "Gebre-Mariams" (slaves of Mary) mushroomed across the South."

period since the military committee that conducted the revolution (known as the "Derg") neither addressed the national question properly, nor ushered in a positive social transformation.

This reinforced peasants' mobilisation around passive resistance and opened rural Ethiopia to ethnic-based political movements²⁰. Among them, one must emphasize TPLF (Tigray People's Liberation Front) and OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) which are still playing a major role in Ethiopian politics with TPLF leading the current ruling party EPRDF and OLF standing for one of the most virulent and threatening opposition parties in Ethiopia. This strong militancy from Tigreans and Oromos is easily understandable since both ethnic groups consider to have paid the highest price during the Shoa empire: the formers don't forgive to have been deprived from their past glory by the Amhara aristocracy while the latter deeply resent its refusal to give them the political representation they would have deserved due to their demographic superiority.

More precisely, TPLF was created in February 1975 as a partnership between peasants and students in the Tigray region. Though first characterized as a national liberation movement, TPLF soon renounced of fighting for secession at the benefit of self-determination within Tigray to liberate it from a century of Amhara domination (see Young (1997)) and to revive their past glory. Indeed, such a political platform was more likely to appeal to Tigrayan grassroots who, as already mentioned, consider themselves as a founding component of Ethiopia through their Aksumite ancestors.

As for OLF, it was created in 1976 because "of a widespread feeling that Oromos were under-represented in the central government and treated as "second-class citizens"" (Joireman, 1997). OLF was soon divided into two trends. The first one struggled for a radical ethnic separatism, arguing, like Asafa (1993), that "Oromia was not part of Ethiopia before its colonisation in the last decades of the nineteenth century" and that "Oromos ha[d] always been historically, culturally and linguistically different from the Ethiopians". The second trend was promoting self-determination without secession, claiming that the history of the incorporation of Oromos into Ethiopia, though having contributed to their subjection, couldn't validate the thesis of a separate historical and geographical identity.

One should notice that no political mobilisation emerged from SNNPs. Indeed, their resentment was considerably tempered by the Derg regime which abolished serfdom and restored their lands from Northerners.

As for Amharas, their opposition against the Derg for having put an end to Haile Selassie's regime was much more recent than that amassed by Oromos and Tigreans over centuries since they had been occupying a dominant position so far. Yet, in 1975, members of the former Amhara aristocracy created EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union), a very conservative political organisation aiming at restoring the Shoa empire.

The most prominent opposition forces, TPLF and OLF, could never coordinate their efforts since Oromos (Tigreans) assimilated Tigreans (Oromos) with northern (southern) dominators (conquered people). TPLF tried to reduce OLF's support in the countryside with the creation in 1990 of an Oromo-based affiliated party: OPDO (Oromo People's Democratic Organisation). It also created the same year an Amhara-based satellite party: EPDM (Ethiopian People's

²⁰As mentioned by Joireman (1997), "Ethnicity was chosen by groups in the countryside as a marker of political affiliation, and many of those now functioning as parties have their beginnings in these ethnically based insurgent groups during the Derg era."

Democratic Movement)²¹. TPLF, OPDO, and EPDM gathered into EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) which drove the military government out of power in May 1991.

2.2 The politicization of ethnicity through ethnic federalism

TPLF/EPRDF soon announced its objective to implement a "dual transition, from an ethnically dominated empire to an ethnically egalitarian nation-state and from authoritarian rule to democracy" (Harbeson (1998)).

This ambition to establish an ethnically egalitarian nation-state appeared as best achievable through the instauration of ethnic federalism since it was supposed to solve Ethiopia's chronic ethnic conflicts generated by the flawed nation-building process of the 19th and 20th century. Indeed, former "Amhara-dominated" ethnic groups who had been denied in their identity for centuries wouldn't have accepted a federal arrangement along the provincial lines that existed prior to 1991 as acknowledged by Mengisteab (2001)²².

However, the promises of ethnic federalism were short-lived, and soon betrayed TPLF's "divide and rule" strategy (Ghai (2000))²³ aiming at securing Tigreans' political supremacy resulting notably in a pro-Tigrean public good allocation due to an excessive financial dependence of the federal regions on the central government.

The available data on regional allocation from government-controlled sources clearly demonstrates the uneven distribution of national resources. The regional per capita capital expenditures, federal subsidies and foreign loans/aid that can be inferred from the March 2001 Report of the Ethiopian Central Statistical Authority, are reported in Table 3. Gudina (2003) highlights: "even the official data on the regional distribution of money from the national treasury and external sources could not conceal the disproportionate flow of resources to the ruling elite's home base of Tigray (...). The Tigray region's per capita share of the federal subsidy is consistently higher than Oromia, Amhara and SNNP regions, which constitute more than 80% of the country's population. The same is true for capital expenditures per capita as well as foreign loan and aid per capita. (...) In fact, the capital expenditure per capita for Tigray is two to three times greater than Oromia".

	Per capita		
	Capital expenditures	Federal subsidies	Foreign loan and aid
Amhara	17.6	32.9	9.4
Oromia	13.5	27.4	6.9
SNNP	16.9	35.2	10.6
Tigray	30.6	49.4	16.1

²¹This organisation changed its name to the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) in 1994.

²²The federal arrangement along ethnic lines gave "broad powers on matters of culture, education, health, economic development and internal security including police forces and courts" to ethnic regions. "Among the matters under the jurisdiction of the central government are defense, foreign affairs, fiscal and monetary policy, citizenship, and establishment and administration of major development projects and major communication networks" (Mengisteab (2001)).

²³Gudina (2003) refers to the last 15 years as the "Tigrayan antithesis" to imitate Levine's terminology. He contends: "in less than two decades, the Tigrayan "antithesis", the negation of the Ethiopian synthesis is in full swing, remaking Ethiopia in a manner that fundamentally changes the country's political landscape".

Table 3: Regional per capita capital expenditures, federal subsidies and foreign loans/aid as for year 1999/2000 (CSA Report, March 2001)

This inequality of treatment is perceived by 63.5% of the 326 respondents (see Question VII.1.g and the related statistics in the Appendix), among which 89.9% of Oromos, 80% of Amharas and 71.% of SNNPs, but only 14.8% of Tigreans who totally lack objectivity certainly because they are precisely the beneficiaries of such a discriminatory policy.

Though favouring a minority of the Ethiopian population (we recall that Tigreans stand for less than 6% of it -see Table 1), EPRDF managed to resist its political adversaries through a "divide" strategy and authoritarian methods of keeping power.

2.2.1 EPRDF's "divide" strategy

The "divide" strategy is largely the result of ethnic federalism. Indeed, the federal arrangement along ethnic lines contributed to make ethnic regions retire within themselves and undermined the creation of opposition parties transcending ethnic lines. As mentioned by Gudina (2003), "the right to secede is mere rhetoric to give the pretence that the EPRDF has addressed the national question in Ethiopia and to redirect the attention of various groups away from bigger national agendas and force them to be locked in narrow regional political and economic issues". Ethnic federalism thus led to what Vaughan (2003) calls the "ethnicisation" of Ethiopian politics (resulting precisely from the "politicization of ethnicity"), with the creation, and reinforcement when they already exist, of ethnic-based opposition parties over the 90's: OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) and ONC (Oromo National Congress) for Oromos, AAPO (All Amhara People's Organisation) for Amharas, and SEPDC (Southern Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Coalition) for SNNPs. The breaking up of opposition forces through ethnic federalism is reinforced by the creation by EPRDF of ethnic-based satellite parties known as "PDOs" (because their names generally end by "People's Democratic Organisation") in each ethnic region and sub-region. Through propaganda backed by kebele and woreda officials²⁴, EPRDF manages to considerably reduce support towards ethnic-based opposition parties in these areas during elections.

Ethiopian politics over the last decade are thus characterized by a double instrumentalisation of ethnicity by EPRDF. Indeed, EPRDF first uses ethnicity as a criterion of "good birth" (the Aksumite origins of Tigreans) for legitimating their privileged access to national resources. Secondly, they manipulate federalism along ethnic lines to divide the country.

The exacerbation of ethnic conflicts consecutive to EPRDF's "divide" strategy seems well perceived by respondents (see Question VII.2. and the related statistics in the Appendix) with 54.3% of the respondents considering that "Ethiopia is a rather divided country where federal regions may enter into conflict against each other". Once again, perception is strongly biased among Tigreans with only 22.7% of them agreeing with this statement, against 68.5% for Amharas, 63.8% for Oromos and 61.5% for SNNPs. This particularly results in respondent's rejection of "ethnic federalism" to the benefit of "regional federalism" (57.6% of those considering Ethiopia as a rather divided country choose "regional federalism" against 30.5% supporting the "no federalism at all" option) -see Question

²⁴"Kebele" and "woreda" are respectively the first and the second smallest administrative units of the country.

VII.3. and the related statistics in the Appendix. This is confirmed for all ethnic groups including Tigreans (65.9% support regional federalism), which seems understandable. Indeed, ethnic federalism has a seamy side for Tigreans since it dangerously empowers Oromia and its secessionist ambition. Switching from ethnic federalism to regional federalism would enable to split it up and thus weaken this challenging opposition force.

2.2.2 EPRDF's "rule" strategy

In addition to instrumentalising ethnicity, EPRDF also implements authoritarian methods to keep power that ultimately result in a blatant lack of competitiveness, freeness and even fairness of the electoral process (see Pausewang and al. (2003))²⁵.

The lack of competitiveness in Ethiopian politics started as soon as June 1992 with the harassment of non-EPRDF candidates and opposition parties that triggered off the withdrawal of OLF from the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). Gudina (2003) quotes a study conducted by the Department of Political Science and International Relations of Addis Ababa University showing that more than 56% of the people interviewed across the country reported a lack of genuine choices among candidates during 1995 elections. This figure is higher in the Oromia region, the southern Ethiopian peoples and Addis Ababa (71%, 72% and 75.6% of the respondents respectively)²⁶.

Freeness of elections is also considerably undermined by pressures on potential proponents of opposition parties, specially in rural areas that count for 85% of the Ethiopian population and thus make the manipulation of peasants essential for EPRDF to keep power. Among the potential retaliations putting pressure on the rural electorate, Pausewang and Tronvoll (2000) mention the "vote for food" mechanism consisting in providing food aid during dearth times only to those who showed their support to the ruling party, the use of kebele administration to control peasantry (as it was the case during the Derg's regime), and the creation of EPRDF-affiliated peasants' associations for the provision of seeds and fertilizers increasing farmers' dependency on EPRDF and thus decreasing their means to oppose it²⁷.

Violation of elections' fairness was also relied on by EPRDF, though to a lesser extent. Pausewang and al. (2003) report for instance the occasional count of invalid ballot papers for EPRDF, and, in very rare cases, the stuffing of the ballot box with votes before the elections take place. This justifies that Ethiopia is ranked by Diamond (2002) among the competitive "liberalized competitive democracies" characterized by nominally competitive elections but actually seriously flawed elections (with political intimidation, vote buying, questionable ballot counts... etc).

The weaknesses of Ethiopian democracy are well perceived by respondents (36.8% consider that democracy is functioning badly or very badly and 18.4% that it is functioning well or very well) even though 42% of them consider the recently started democratisation process as a mitigating circumstance²⁸-see Question VII.4.a. and the related statistics in the Appendix. Yet, focussing on

²⁵The first regional and federal elections took place in 1995 and the first local elections (kebele and woreda ones) in 1996. Each of them is organised every 5 years.

²⁶As a result, the EPRDF won 90% of the seats, leading Tronvoll and Aadland (1995) to characterise 1995 Regional and Federal elections as neither "free, [nor] fair [nor] impartial".

²⁷Other strategies consist in postponing the voting date until periods of intensive work for peasants (like the harvesting) in regions where opposition against EPRDF is particularly vivid so as to dissuade potential adversaries from expressing their dissatisfaction with government through voting (this strategy was used during 2001 local elections in the Hadiya zone).

²⁸The Tigrean ethnic bias expresses through the fact that Tigrean students comprise the highest proportion of "optimists" (42% contend that democracy is functioning well or very well), and the lowest proportion of "pessimists" (only 8% contend that democracy is functioning badly or very badly).

what Bratton and Watten (2001) call the "procedural" approach to democracy (including all the political procedures like competitive, free, and fair elections, or the protection of human rights), respondents remain overwhelmingly pessimistic except regarding the competitiveness of elections since opposition parties do exist and participate, though hardly, in the electoral competition: 73.3% consider elections as "competitive", 44.5% as "free", 22.1% as "fair", and 38.7% consider that human rights are respected)²⁹(see Question VII.4.b. and the related statistics in the Appendix).

However, despite the persistence of electoral cheating, observers like Pausewang and al. (2003) globally acknowledge an improvement in the democratisation process: "Despite the democratic deficiencies of the EPRDF government, the difference between the current and the previous regime is unmistakable. The military dictatorship of Mengistu applied open force and undisguised violence. (...) Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has introduced democratic institutions". This feeling is shared by students since 59.5% noticed an improvement in the democratic procedures over the last 10 years (15.3% consider that the democratic quality has been stagnating, and 22.7% that it has been worsening³⁰) -see Question VII.5. and the related statistics in the Appendix. This notably expresses through the existence of the NEB (National Electoral Board) in charge officially of the impartial and autonomous organisation of elections. Though often in collusion with EPRDF's manipulation of the vote, it also showed its ability to organise relatively fair elections as it was the case when elections were re-scheduled after the cancellation of May 2000 national elections in Hadiya and several other woreda in Southern regions due to serious electoral fraud. One may also mention the development of civil society organisations that "have made a modest impact on public attitudes" by "promot[ing] public awareness and stimulate public discussion about democratic rights and responsible governance" (Rahmato (2002)). The independent press also increased its sphere of influence as noticed by Bensa (2002)³¹. Finally, this democratic progress enabled the diversification of political opposition with the emergence of new adversaries to EPRDF in recent years.

2.3 The Ethiopian opposition parties

Since 1991, the Ethiopian political opposition has been evolving, gathering nowadays ethnic-based opposition parties, multi-ethnic parties, and non-ethnic parties.

2.3.1 The ethnic-based opposition parties

To appeal to their ethnic constituencies, ethnic-based opposition parties tend to become, like EPRDF, "ethnicity-oriented" parties. Indeed, they defend political platforms that may be interpreted as potentially promising a privileged access to national resources to their own ethnic group (exactly as does TPLF through EPRDF) so as to take revenge of their current status of dominated ethnic group.

OLF and ONC They result from the two opposite trends that were destabilizing OLF prior to 1991.

²⁹The Tigrayan ethnic bias appears once again very clearly: 85.2% consider elections as "competitive", 80.7% as "free", 45.5% as "fair", and 79.5% consider that human rights are respected.

³⁰Oromos are the only ones to be more to consider that the democratic situation worsened rather than improved.

³¹"The independent press has, despite its infancy, been informative, daring and remarkably outspoken. It has vigorously and audaciously reported on topics of national concern and of absorbing interests to readers".

Under such settings, post-1991 OLF is still promoting ethnic separatism (OLF Programme, 1976) and has been refusing to renounce of violence since its withdrawal from TGE in 1992. This legally prevents him from being recognized as a political party and thus from participating in elections even though OLF-affiliated parties like OPLO (Oromo People's Liberation Organisation), officially not involved in the military struggle, compete against EPRDF during voting days.

OLF's separatist platform clearly betrays its intention of favouring Oromos at the cost of other ethnic groups since Oromia is considered as the storehouse of Ethiopia: it could thus become an economically self-sufficient state in itself depriving the rest of the Ethiopian population of vital resources. It is interesting to note that Oromos are the most numerous (26.1%) to support ethnic federalism, against 18.2% for Tigreans, 9.2% for Amharas and 2.6% for SNNPs. This betrays that ethnic federalism is perceived as a windfall for some of them since it empowered the main Oromo opposition party and its secessionist claims.

A less radical option was promoted by ONC created in 1996. Indeed, contrary to OLF, ONC claims for the "recognition" of Oromia within a unified democratized Ethiopian state (ONC Programme, 1996) which may mask just beneath the surface the will to advantage Oromos. An ethnicity-oriented drift of ONC's political platform is all the more credible that Oromos' demographic superiority compared to other ethnic groups would increase its bargaining power at the House of People's Representatives.

AAPO It was created as a political movement in January 1992. It is among the most vocal opposition parties and gathers people who Paul Henze (1998) refers to as "Amhara centrists" feeling resentment after having lost "the dominant position they enjoyed in Ethiopia for a century". This explains why AAPO is so critical towards ethnic federalism and the right to self-determination that it considers as potentially "dismantling the Ethiopian state" (Joireman (1997)). On the contrary, AAPO supports the "national building" thesis³² and struggles for the unity of "Greater Ethiopia" (including Eritrea).

AAPO's political platform may convey the secret temptation of restoring a centralized power that could accrue to Amharas, as it was the case during the Shoa empire. However, this "ethnicity-oriented" temptation is less blatant and easily workable than in the case of OLF or ONC since AAPO's priority claim remains the geographical integrity of Ethiopia. It is interesting to note that Amharas are the most numerous (29.2%) to support the "no federalism" option, against 18.9% for Oromos, 17.9% for SNNPs and 14.8% for Tigreans.

SEPDC It was created in 1992 by Beyene Petros (the Deputy Minister of Education at that time) as an umbrella organisation for 15 different SNNPR-based parties fighting for the recognition of southern minorities.

However, contrary to OLF, ONC, and, to some extent, AAPO, SEPDC may not be considered as a pure "ethnicity-oriented" party aiming at defending the interest of southern ethnic groups at the cost of others. Indeed, its first priority merely consists in ensuring equality of treatment between them and the rest of Ethiopia, which is already a great challenge since such an equality has rarely been achieved so far.

³²Gudina (2003) recalls: "To be fair, the supporters of the "nation-building" thesis are not from one ethnic group exclusively. However, the Amhara elite, the main beneficiary of the spoils of the empire, is the most dominant among them".

2.3.2 A multi-ethnic opposition party: CAFPDE (Council of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy)

It is the result of the Peace and Reconciliation Conference that was held in December 1993 in Addis Ababa. It assembled opposition parties questioning the legitimacy of the transitional regime and originated from the agreement of 31 political organisations to form a coalition led by Beyene Petros, including SEPDC and EDU.

Multi-ethnic parties may be considered as potentially "Ethiopia-oriented" (i.e: as potentially struggling for an equitable distribution of public good between ethnic groups) since the political union between rather "ethnicity-oriented" parties (which is very clear for instance as regarding EDU) may be a sign of their motivation to find a mutually profitable agreement. However, tensions between various ethnic groups do exist and show "the problems of opposition in aggregating interests between ethnic groups, and in presenting an attractive and realistic alternative to the EPRDF" (Joireman (1997)).

2.3.3 The non-ethnic opposition parties

The splitting up of opposition along ethnic lines was also accompanied in recent years by the emergence of non-ethnic parties which clearly promote non discriminatory politics. They appear as credible substitutes to the too strongly "Amhara-connoted" opposition parties supporting the "nation building" thesis (AAPO and EDU), even though the most famous of them originate from such Amhara-based organisations.

This is notably the case of EDUP (Ethiopian Democratic Union Party), a successor of the conservative EDU (see Pausewang and al. (2003)) that however radically diverges from EDU's political platform. Indeed, contrary to EDU which rejects any kind of federalism, EDUP promotes a federal arrangement around provincial lines that makes the potential restoration of the former Amhara centralised power unreachable.

A second major Ethiopia-oriented party, EDP (Ethiopian Democratic Party), was created prior to 2000 national elections by former members of AAPO. Like EDUP, EDP promotes regional federalism and may be perceived as more sincerely "Ethiopia-oriented" compared to EDUP since its political birthplace (AAPO) is less strongly affiliated to the former Amhara ruling elite in people's mind than EDU.

The emergence of Ethiopia-oriented parties is rather surprising if one considers that parties are generally opportunistic and defend the platforms that are the most likely to be elected by self-interested citizens. Indeed, voting for a party that fights for the interests of one's own ethnic group (when one, of course, is free to do so) is clearly a weakly dominant strategy as it appears in Table 4.

This table is drawn from few basic assumptions. We first normalise the size of the Ethiopian population to 1. We then suppose that Ethiopia is composed of the 4 main ethnic groups above mentioned that we index by j , with $j = a$ referring to Amharas, $j = o$ to Oromos, $j = s$ to Southern Nations, Nationalities Peoples and $j = t$ to Tigreans. We assume that each ethnic group stands for a proportion that we note α_j in the population. From Table 1, we know that $\alpha_t < \alpha_s < \alpha_a < \alpha_o$ with $\alpha_j < 0.5$ for $j \in \{a, o, s, t\}$ ³³ and $\sum_{j \in \{a, o, s, t\}} \alpha_j = 1$.

We note X the total size of the public good to be divided between citizens.

³³According to Table 1, when focussing only on these 4 ethnic groups, we get that: $\alpha_o = 0.41$, $\alpha_a = 0.3$, $\alpha_s = 0.23$, and $\alpha_t = 0.06$.

We assume that there are two groups of political parties that we index by e when they refer to "Ethiopia-oriented" parties, and by j (with $j \in \{a, o, s, t\}$) when they refer to ethnicity-oriented parties. We note C_E a coalition of Ethiopia-oriented parties, and C_J a coalition of ethnicity-oriented parties.

We know that Ethiopia-oriented parties promote an egalitarian distribution of the public good among citizens whatever their ethnic belonging. This particularly means that when platforms of Ethiopia-oriented parties are implemented, each person receives an X amount of the public good (i.e: $\frac{X}{1}$) since the population is normalised to 1.

On the contrary, we know that "ethnicity-oriented" parties instrumentalise ethnicity and draw votes from people belonging to the ethnic group they represent by trying to give them a greater amount of public good per person than X if they are elected. We note ξ_j the proportion of public good granted by the "ethnicity-oriented" party j to its ethnic group. For the ethnic vote-catching strategy to be successful, the public good amount granted to each individual from the same ethnic group must be greater than X . We must therefore have:

$$X_j = \frac{\xi_j}{\alpha_j} X \geq X,$$

which implies that:

$$\xi_j \geq \alpha_j.$$

We know that $\alpha_t < \alpha_s < \alpha_a < \alpha_o$. This particularly implies that Tigreans-oriented parties do not need to be as discriminatory as SNNPs-oriented parties, which do not need to be as discriminatory as Amharas-oriented parties, which do not need to be as discriminatory as Oromos-oriented parties.

However, such ethnicity-oriented programs cannot be implemented as such since $\alpha_j < 0.5$, which means that even if all people from one ethnic group vote for their ethnicity-oriented party, this party won't get the majority at the House of People's Representatives³⁴. This particularly means that ethnicity-oriented parties need to form coalitions with other parties to reach the majority. We must distinguish two cases. In the first case, the ethnicity-oriented party under consideration forms a majority coalition with other parties encompassing notably Ethiopia-oriented parties. In the second case, the ethnicity-oriented party forms a majority coalition with other ethnicity-oriented parties only.

We first consider the case where one ethnicity-oriented party forms a majority coalition with other parties encompassing notably Ethiopia-oriented parties. There are four kinds of such majority coalitions. In particular, we note $C_{e,j}^M$ the majority coalition between one Ethiopia-oriented party and one ethnicity-oriented party j and $C_{C_E,j}^M$ the majority coalition between a coalition of Ethiopia-oriented parties and one ethnicity-oriented party j . We note C_{e,C_J}^M the majority coalition between one Ethiopia-oriented party and a coalition of ethnicity-oriented parties denoted by C_J , and C_{C_E,C_J}^M the majority coalition between a coalition of Ethiopia-oriented party and a coalition of ethnicity-oriented parties denoted by C_J . In such coalitions, we assume that the ethnicity-oriented party(ies) renounce(s) of its (their) ethnicity-oriented character when forming

³⁴The allocation of seats to Ethiopian various constituencies at the House of People's Representatives is organised according to a "first past the post" system. Under this system, the candidate who receives more votes than any competitor within a constituency is declared the winner of the constituency's seats. However, majority is necessary within the House of People's Representatives.

majority coalitions with one or more Ethiopia-oriented parties, which means that coalitions $C_{e,j}^M$, $C_{C_E,j}^M$, C_{e,C_J}^M , or C_{C_E,C_J}^M defend an egalitarian distribution of the public good among people so that each person receives an $X_{e,j} = X_{C_E,C_J} = X_{e,C_J} = X_{C_E,C_J} = X$ amount of it.

In the case where an ethnicity-oriented party forms a majority coalition with other ethnicity-oriented parties only, such majority coalitions denoted C_J^M belong to the $\{C_J^M\}$ set that is given by³⁵:

$$\{C_J^M\} = \{\{o, a\}, \{o, s\}, \{a, s\}, \{a, o, s\}, \{a, o, t\}, \{a, s, t\}, \{o, s, t\}, \{a, o, s, t\}\}.$$

For any coalition C_J^M belonging to $\{C_J^M\}$, we suppose that the amount of public good per person in ethnic group j (when the ethnicity-oriented party j belongs to C_J^M) is given by:

$$X_{j \in C_J^M} = \frac{\xi_j^C}{\alpha_j} X \geq X,$$

with ξ_j^C depending on the party's bargaining power within the coalition $\{C_J^M\}$. This particularly suggests that $\xi_j^C \leq \xi_j$ since ξ_j is the unlimited bargaining power of an ethnicity-oriented party in the unrealistic scenario where he wins the majority on its own.

Table 4 shows the amount of public good X_i that one individual i receives, knowing that he has the choice between voting for an Ethiopia-oriented party or for his ethnicity-oriented party indexed by k (with $k \in \{a, o, s, t\}$). We must distinguish two main cases: either the party individual i votes for belongs to the majority coalition, either the party individual i votes for belongs to the minority.

We first consider the case where the party the individual votes for belongs to the majority coalition. We must then consider two possibilities. First, the party the individual votes for may join a majority coalition encompassing Ethiopia-oriented parties, which means that it joins a $C_{e,j}$, $C_{C_E,j}$, C_{e,C_J} , or C_{C_E,C_J} . We know that the political platform of such majority coalitions provides every individual with an $X_{e,j} = X_{C_E,C_J} = X_{e,C_J} = X_{C_E,C_J} = X$ amount of public good no matter whether the individual voted for his ethnicity-oriented party or for an Ethiopia-oriented party. Second, the party the individual votes for may join a C_J coalition encompassing ethnicity-oriented parties only. This means that if the individual votes for an ethnicity-oriented party, then the majority coalition C_J^M that it forms with the C_J coalition provides him with an $X_i = X_{k \in C_J^M} \geq X$ amount of public good. On the contrary, if the party the individual votes for is Ethiopia-oriented, then the majority coalition C_{e,C_J}^M that it forms with the C_J coalition provides him with an $X_i = X_{e,C_J} = X$ amount of public good.

We now consider the case where the party the individual votes for belongs to the minority coalition. We must then consider two possibilities. First, the majority may be a C_J^M majority coalition of ethnicity-oriented parties that does not encompass ethnicity-oriented party k ($k \notin C_J^M$) which means that the amount of public good received by the individual is given by $X_i = X_{k \notin C_J^M} = \frac{(1 - \sum_{j \in C_J^M} \xi_j^C) X}{1 - \sum_{j \in C_J^M} \alpha_j} \leq X$ whatever his vote. Second, the majority may be a $C_{e,j}^M$, $C_{C_E,j}^M$, C_{e,C_J}^M , or C_{C_E,C_J}^M coalition which means that the amount of public good

³⁵We do not consider 2-parties coalitions encompassing the Tigray-based EPRDF since they don't ensure majority.

received by the individual is given by $X_i = X_{e,j} = X_{C_E,C_J} = X_{e,C_J} = X_{C_E,C_J} = X$ whatever his vote.

Table 4 summarizes such outcomes. It clearly shows that the action "voting for an ethnicity-oriented party" is a weakly dominant strategy since it provides the individual with more public good than when he votes for an Ethiopia-oriented party in case his ethnicity-oriented party joins a majority coalition of ethnicity-oriented parties.

The supported party forms a majority coalition with "Ethiopia-oriented" parties	...forms a majority coalition with "ethnicity-oriented" parties	... belongs to the minority knowing that the majority is "ethnicity-oriented"	... belongs to the minority knowing that the majority is "Ethiopia-oriented"
Voting for an "Ethiopia-oriented" party	$X_i = X$	$X_i = X$	$X_i \leq X$	$X_i = X$
Voting for an "ethnicity-oriented" party	$X_i = X$	$X_i \geq X$	$X_i \leq X$	$X_i = X$

Table 4: Payoff matrix for a citizen having the choice between voting for an "Ethiopia-oriented" party or an "ethnicity-oriented" party favouring his own ethnic group

Even when the respondent is indifferent between voting for an "Ethiopia-oriented" party and voting for an "ethnicity-oriented" party, he may remain inclined to support the latter one due to his affective attachment to his ethnic group (this attachment may indeed lead people to consider "ethnicity-oriented" parties as more trustworthy than "Ethiopia-oriented" ones). The higher trust level of an individual towards people sharing the same ethnic belonging compared to the trust he feels towards people from other ethnic groups is revealed through a "trust" question (see Question VII.6. in the Appendix). On average, while 58.3% of the respondents declare to trust people sharing the same ethnic belonging, only 40.2% trust people belonging to other ethnic groups (this "trust bias" towards people belonging to the same ethnic group is verified within each of them).

In such a setting, the emergence of "Ethiopia-oriented" parties may be explained by ethical altruistic founders and/or, which is more credible, the existence of ethical altruists among Ethiopian citizens since voting for an Ethiopia-oriented party implies to renounce first of the affective attachment to one's ethnic group and second of the material benefit granted by one's ethnicity-oriented party in case it belongs to a majority coalition at the House of People's Representatives.

One shall however notice that this ethical altruism may not be similarly costly for all ethnic groups. For Oromos for instance, ethical altruism may require higher sacrifice since the probability to belong to a majority coalition favouring discriminatory politics is higher for them than for other ethnic groups due to their already mentioned demographic superiority. Ethical altruism may also be relatively high for SNNPs (though lower than for Oromos) compared to Amharas since they may be more easily integrated by Oromos in a majority coalition due to their joint belonging to Southern ethnic groups. The relatively low cost of ethical altruism for Amharas may be accentuated by the fact that the renouncement of the affective attachment to their ethnic group may not be total since "Ethiopia-oriented" parties draw their origins in Amhara-based political organisations (although their platforms seem totally purged of any discriminatory motivation). In such settings, one shouldn't be surprised to find that ethical altruism is stronger among Amharas than among SNNPS, and

stronger among SNNPs than among Oromos. As for Tigreans, the cost of being ethical altruist may be the highest since it implies their renouncement of a real pro-Tigrean policy.

Finally, it may be that ethical altruism is a "luxury" feeling that increases with individuals' income (see Margolis, 1984³⁶). It may also be that altruism is something proper to students.

In the following of the paper, we test, on the basis of a simple model, whether respondents show ethical altruism in their political preferences that we reveal through an "approval voting" question and a "voting" question. Relying on two questions enables us to enrich, as we will show, our understanding of respondent's preferences all the more since the "voting question", perhaps considered as too brusque by respondents, is answered by slightly more than 50% only (on the contrary, only 6% refuse to answer the "approval voting" question).

3 Modelling ethical altruistic voting

We assume that individual i from ethnic group k is characterized by a utility function $U_i^k(Y; \gamma_i^k)$ which is a combination of an egoistic utility function and an ethical altruistic one deriving from standard euclidean preferences:

$$U_i^k(Y; \gamma_i^k) = (1 - \gamma_i^k)Y - \frac{\gamma_i^k}{2}(Y - X)^2,$$

where Y is the quantity of public good chosen by the individual through his vote and X is the fair quantity of public good per person in case of an egalitarian distribution of public good (we recall that the population is normalised to 1). We note γ_i^k ($\gamma_i^k \in [0, 1]$) the individual's degree of ethical altruism, which means his efforts for renouncing of supporting the ethnicity-oriented party favouring his ethnic group k and for voting instead for an Ethiopia-oriented party defending an egalitarian allocation of public good between ethnic groups.

3.1 Predicting voting

We note $\{X_{k \notin C_J^M}\}$ the set of public good amounts provided to each individual belonging to ethnic group k by a majority coalition C_J^M of ethnicity oriented parties that does not encompass the ethnicity-oriented party k ($k \notin C_J^M$).

We note $\{X_{k \in C_J^M}\}$ the set of public good amounts provided to each individual belonging to ethnic group k by a majority coalition C_J^M of ethnicity oriented parties that encompasses the ethnicity-oriented party k ($k \in C_J^M$).

We recall that the amount of public good per person provided by a majority coalition of one or more Ethiopia-oriented parties with one or more ethnicity-oriented parties is given by X .

Moreover, we also consider in the following the two rather unrealistic scenarios where an ethnicity-oriented party wins the majority on its own. In case this ethnicity-oriented party favors ethnic group k , the public good amount provided to each individual belonging to ethnic group k is given by $X_k \geq X_{k \in C_J^M}$ for all $X_{k \in C_J^M} \in \{X_{k \in C_J^M}\}$ since $\xi_k \geq \xi_k^C$. In case this ethnicity-oriented party favors another ethnic group than k (say j), the public good amount provided to each individual belonging to ethnic group k is given by $X_j = \frac{1 - \xi_j}{1 - \alpha_j} X \leq X$ with $j \neq k$.

³⁶More precisely, Margolis (1984) consider that "the likelihood that an individual that he calls "Smith" will allocate a marginal dollar [for his self-interest] rather than [for the interest of other people] must increase in the *participation ratio g/s*" where g stands for the amount already given to other people and s the amount already given to himself.

Voting results are given by the maximisation of $U_i^k(Y; \gamma_i^k)$ over Y with Y belonging to the choice set W_k given by

$$W_k = \{X_j, \{X_{k \notin C_j^M}\}, X, \{X_{k \in C_j^M}\}, X_k\},$$

with $X_j \leq X \leq X_{k \in C_j^M} \leq X_k$ and $X_{k \notin C_j^M} \leq X \leq X_{k \in C_j^M} \leq X_k$ for all $X_{k \notin C_j^M} \in \{X_{k \notin C_j^M}\}$ and for all $X_{k \in C_j^M} \in \{X_{k \in C_j^M}\}$.

The result of the maximisation of $U_i^k(Y; \gamma_i^k)$ over Y is given by:

$$Y_i^{k*} = X + \frac{1 - \gamma_i^k}{\gamma_i^k}.$$

This simply means that when the respondent is strongly ethical altruist ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 1$), then he chooses $Y_i^{k*} = X$.

On the contrary, when the respondent is strongly egoist ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 0$), then he chooses Y_i^{k*} given by

$$Y_i^{k*} = \max_{Y \in W_k} Y \geq X.$$

This particularly means that Y_i^{k*} belongs to $\{X_{k \in C_j^M}\}$ in the case of a realistic scenario where the ethnicity-oriented party k needs to form coalition with other ethnicity-oriented parties to reach the majority, or that $Y_i^{k*} = X_k$ in the unrealistic scenario. In both cases, the individual votes for the ethnicity-oriented party favoring his own ethnic group k .

3.2 Predicting approval voting

The "approval voting" question consists in asking people whether they would be happy or not if a given political party wins the elections (this question thus includes unrealistic scenarios where an ethnicity-oriented party gets the majority at the House of People's Representatives). We consider that the respondent is happy if his utility is close to his indirect utility when the party under consideration is elected.

When the respondent is strongly ethical altruist ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 1$), we know that his indirect utility function is given by

$$V_{i,alt}^k = 0,$$

since he chooses $Y_i^{k*} = X$.

On the contrary, when the respondent is strongly egoist ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 0$), his indirect utility function is given by

$$V_{i,ego}^k = \max_{Y \in W_k} Y \geq X.$$

3.2.1 The case of "Ethiopia-oriented" parties

The utility of an individual characterized by γ_i^k when an Ethiopia-oriented party is elected is given by:

$$U_i^k(X; \gamma_i^k) = (1 - \gamma_i^k)X.$$

It is obvious that $V_{i,ego}^k > U_i^k(X; \gamma_i^k \rightarrow 0)$ which means that strongly egoistic people ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 0$) should systematically disapprove Ethiopia-oriented parties.

Similarly, $V_{i,alt}^k = U_i^k(X; \gamma_i^k \rightarrow 1)$ which means that Ethiopia-oriented parties provide strongly ethical altruistic people ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 1$) with the utility they long for. This implies that such ethical altruistic people systematically approve Ethiopia-oriented parties.

3.2.2 The case of "ethnicity-oriented" parties

We must distinguish the case where the ethnicity-oriented party favors the ethnic group k of individual i (we qualify it as "favorable"), and the case where it favors people from another ethnic group (we qualify it as "hostile").

Favorable ethnicity-oriented parties The utility of an individual characterized by γ_i^k when a favorable ethnicity-oriented party k is elected is given by:

$$U_i^k(X_k; \gamma_i^k) = (1 - \gamma_i^k)X_k - \frac{\gamma_i^k}{2}(X_k - X)^2,$$

with $X_k \geq X$.

It is obvious that $V_{i,ego}^k = U_i^k(X_k; \gamma_i^k \rightarrow 0)$ which means that a favorable ethnicity-oriented party provides strongly egoistic people ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 0$) with the utility they long for, and thus is systematically approved by them.

Similarly, $V_{i,alt}^k > U_i^k(X_k; \gamma_i^k \rightarrow 1)$ which means that strongly ethical altruistic people ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 1$) should systematically disapprove favorable ethnicity-oriented parties.

Hostile ethnicity-oriented parties The utility of an individual characterized by γ_i^k when an hostile ethnicity-oriented party favouring ethnic group j (with $j \neq i$) is elected is given by:

$$U_i^k(X_j; \gamma_i^k) = (1 - \gamma_i^k)X_j - \frac{\gamma_i^k}{2}(X_j - X)^2,$$

with $X_j \leq X$.

It is obvious that $V_{i,ego}^k > U_i^k(X_j; \gamma_i^k \rightarrow 0)$ which means that strongly egoistic people ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 0$) should systematically disapprove hostile ethnicity-oriented parties.

Similarly, $V_{i,alt}^k > U_i^k(X_j; \gamma_i^k \rightarrow 1)$ which means that strongly ethical altruistic people ($\gamma_i^k \rightarrow 1$) should systematically disapprove hostile ethnicity-oriented parties.

To sum everything up, our model predicts that:

- Ethiopia-oriented parties are approved by strongly ethical altruistic people and disapproved by strongly egoistic people
- ethnicity-oriented parties are disapproved by strongly ethical altruistic people be they "favorable" or "hostile"
- favorable ethnicity-oriented parties are approved by strongly egoistic people, while hostile ethnicity-oriented parties are disapproved by them.

It may be that people who believe that there is not credible opposition parties and thus no alternative to EPRDF policy (they may think that opposition candidates, once elected, will assume national resources without giving anything to the population) systematically vote for EPRDF. Indeed, they may consider that any coalition of ethnicity-oriented parties and/or Ethiopia-oriented parties

that does not encompass EPRDF will provide the population with a ε ($\varepsilon \rightarrow 0$) amount of public good. In such a setting, be the individual strongly egoist or strongly ethical altruist, he will always vote for EPRDF whatever his ethnic belonging.

4 Empirical evidence

Before presenting the results of the "approval voting" and "voting" questions and testing whether the predictions of our model are verified or not, we first focus on the general perception of the political parties by the respondents to make sure that our understanding of the Ethiopian political landscape coincides with the students' one.

4.1 Perception of political parties

We draw people's perception of political parties from a question (see "Question IV.1") that asks respondents to characterize them by using six criteria.

Question IV.1.

There are many kinds of political parties. They can be:

- "ethnic-oriented": they favour people from their ethnic-group
- "vote-oriented": they favour people who voted for them
- "rich-oriented": they favour rich people
- "poor-oriented": they favour poor people
- "power oriented": they only care about getting power and not at all about Ethiopian citizens
- "Ethiopia-oriented": they defend the interests of ALL Ethiopian people without favouring any group more than the other.

Could you please indicate whether the following parties are "ethnic-oriented", "vote-oriented", "rich-oriented", "poor-oriented", "power-oriented" or "Ethiopia-oriented"? You can select more than 1 answer for each party.

	Ethnic-oriented	Vote-oriented	Rich-oriented	Poor-oriented	Power-oriented	Ethiopia-oriented	DK/NA
a. EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Republic Democratic Front).....							
b. AAPO (All Amhara People's Organisation).....							
c. SEPDC (Southern Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Coalition)..							
d. CAFPDE (Coalition of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia).....							
e. EDP (Ethiopian Democratic Party).							
f. EDUP (Ethiopian Democratic Union Party).....							
g. ONC (Oromo National Congress)..							
h. OLF (Oromo Liberation Front).....							

[Please place a cross in the box of your choice for each proposition]

These criteria can be split up into three categories. The first category of criteria is related to the more or less discriminatory character of the political program as regarding public good allocation. In this framework, the political party may promote non discrimination (it is then qualified as "Ethiopia-oriented"), or discrimination benefiting to individuals belonging to what it defines as the "right" group.

The belonging to the "right" group may hinge on individual's will. This is the case when this group gathers people who support the party. In such a setting, the party may be qualified as "vote-oriented" since it implements standard clientelism. One should however remember that "positive" standard clientelism is

not common in Ethiopia. Indeed, people voting for EPRDF are not massively rewarded, except in the case of kebele or woreda officials³⁷.

The belonging to the "right" group may be exogenously determined which is the case when this group coincides with the ethnic group. The party is then qualified as "ethnic(ity)-oriented" since it implements ethnic clientelism.

We expect that this first category of characteristics be enhanced by a great majority of respondents since, as already mentioned, political struggle in developing countries like Ethiopia are mainly organized around the public good allocation issue. Moreover, we anticipate that, due to the multi-ethnic character of the Ethiopian society, discrimination, when it is perceived by the respondent, will be more of the ethnic clientelistic type than of the standard clientelistic one.

The second category of criteria refers to the more or less discriminatory character of the political program as regarding tax level which opposes rich people against poor people. In such a framework, the party may be considered as "poor oriented" or "rich oriented". Due to the embryonic tax system, we expect that these criteria be rather irrelevant to characterize Ethiopian political parties and thus be largely neglected by respondents.

We finally consider a third category of criteria that we summarize under the "power oriented" characteristic. This refers to the various strategies of political parties to get and keep power. It of course encompasses the efforts to reinvigorate in people's mind the concept of ethnicity to legitimate ethnic clientelism (this is what we called "instrumentalisation" or "politicization" of ethnicity). It also encompasses strategic standard "positive" clientelism targeting, in each ethnic region, key individuals like kebele or woreda officials so as to buy their support and their efforts to manipulate grassroots in a favorable way for the party; it also comprises "negative" standard clientelism consisting in punishing the most vulnerable people when they do not show their support to the party. One should remember that the instrumentalisation of ethnicity and "positive" and "negative" standard clientelism is widely used by EPRDF to keep power. The "power-oriented" characteristic finally relates to "coalition strategies" aiming at increasing the likelihood of belonging to a majority coalition at the House of People's Representatives.

Answers to Question IV.1. enable to get three kinds of information. The first one consists in computing a "notoriety and clarity" index for each party's platform. We assume that this index is given by the percentage of people having been able to characterize the party (which means all those who answered the question without choosing the "DK/NA" option). The second kind of information is related to the characteristics that are the most frequently used by the respondents to qualify political parties, with the will to test whether the first category of criteria related to public good allocation is actually considered as the most relevant by citizens. Finally, we summarize graphically the respondent's perception of political parties to know whether parties that we described as mainly "Ethiopia-oriented" (resp. mainly "ethnicity oriented") are indeed considered as such by the respondents.

4.1.1 "Notoriety and clarity" index

The percentage of people able to characterize one party is both an indicator of their knowledge of this party's platform (this is the "notoriety" aspect), but

³⁷"Negative" standard clientelism (equivalent to "blackmailing") is yet widespread, specially in rural areas, as already mentioned.

also of the easiness of characterizing such platform by using one or more of the six criteria proposed to individuals (this is the "clarity" aspect).

The ranking of political parties from the best known and least ambiguous to the least known and most ambiguous is given by Table 5. The average of the index is high (68.7%) and does not vary much across ethnic groups (66.4% for Amharas, 69.4% for Oromos, 70.2% for SNNPs and 70.7% for Tigreans) which shows that students are globally well aware of Ethiopian politics.

"Notoriety and clarity" index %	
EPRDF	91.1
OLF	82.2
AAPO	72.7
ONC	70.9
EDP	64.4
SEPDC	62.6
EDUP	55.8
CAFPDE	49.7

Table 5: Parties' "notoriety and clarity" index

As expected, the best known and clearest party is the incumbent one: EPRDF.

One finds then OLF, which cumulates a high notoriety among people due to its historical role in Ethiopian politics (it has been involving in it since 1976) as well as a clear positioning in the political arena with the fight for the secession of Oromia since the beginning. Both of these aspects are reinforced by OLF's implication in armed struggle and terrorist activities (that are often considerably exaggerated by officials aiming at discrediting this challenging opposition party) that crystallize the opposition between Tigreans and Oromos. Even at the time when the questionnaire was conducted, OLF was in the heart of debates among people and specially students. Indeed, OLF was being blamed by the police for being responsible for a bomb attack (which has not been proven yet) one week before the implementation of the survey (on April, 29, 2004) at Addis Ababa University (a grenade was thrown in a television room of the campus during a Tigrayan language news program, killing one student and injuring eight others; this attack was considered by officials as a response to the expulsion of 330 Oromo students from the Addis Ababa University in January 2004³⁸).

Among the other most known and clearest parties, one finds parties created over the 90s: AAPO in 1992, ONC in 1996, and EDP in 2000.

One may be surprised by the relatively bad performance of SEPDC, EDUP, and CAFPDE which is the only political organisation characterized by less than 50% of the respondents. Indeed, SEPDC and CAFPDE embody the early attempts of opposing EPRDF with some successful outcomes (despite widespread electoral fraud, SEPDC seriously challenged EPRDF in some SNNPR's woredas during 2000 and 2001 national and local elections -see Pausewang and al. (2003)). As for EDUP, it derives from a famous historical party created by the Amhara former aristocracy: EDU.

However, as already mentioned in our description of the Ethiopian main opposition parties, SEPDC, EDUP and CAFPDE may be perceived as "ambiguous" by people.

³⁸They were blamed for having participated on January, 4, 2004 in a demonstration protesting against the Federal Government's order that the offices of the Oromia Regional State administration be transferred from Addis Ababa to Adama (also known as Nazareth), a town 100 kilometres east of Addis Ababa.

Indeed, CAFPDE is a multi-ethnic coalition that people may hesitate to characterize as "Ethiopia-oriented" or "ethnicity-oriented" since one does not know whether all ethnic-based parties belonging to CAFPDE truly adhere to a non-discriminatory policy regarding public good allocation or merely instrumentalize this coalition to increase their chance of getting power to then defend the interest of their ethnic group only.

Such hesitations are particularly relevant regarding SEPDC (that is itself a coalition of southern parties) since SEPDC is one of the ethnic-based parties belonging to CAFPDE. Moreover, the difficulty of characterizing SEPDC as "Ethiopia-oriented" or "ethnicity-oriented" is further enhanced by the fact that southern nationalities have long been exploited by the rest of the Ethiopian population (and specially northern people) with notably the creation of the feudal system during the "Amhara synthesis" that enslaved them. SEPDC's struggle for the recognition of southern minorities may thus be considered as fairer (and thus less ethnicity-oriented) than the struggle of more radical ethnic parties like TPLF or OLF.

Finally, the ambiguity of EDUP's political platform may come from its derivation from an Amharas-oriented political organisation (EDU) that calls for the rejection of any kind of federalism with the secret aim at restoring the historical domination of Amhara dynasties over "Greater Ethiopia". Though EDUP promotes regional federalism and equality of treatment between ethnic groups, people may be doubtful about the sincerity of its political platform.

4.1.2 Most frequently used criteria for party's characterization

The percentage of people using at least once each criterion for the characterization of political parties is reported in Table 6. The figures confirm our intuitions. Indeed, they show that the most frequently used criteria are those related to public good allocation since 85.3% of the respondents use at least once the "ethnic-oriented" criterion to characterize parties, 58% the "Ethiopia-oriented" criterion, and 33.1% the "vote-oriented" criterion. These results also validate that clientelism in Ethiopia is primarily based on ethnicity and not on political support.

	%
Ethnic(ity)-oriented	85.3
Ethiopia-oriented	58.0
Power-oriented	37.4
Vote-oriented	33.1
Rich-oriented	10.4
Poor-oriented	9.5

Table 6: Frequency of use of criteria for parties' characterization

EDP is characterized as "Ethiopia-oriented" by the highest percentage of respondents (33.7%). This is verified within each ethnic group at the exception of Tigreans who massively (63.6%) elect EPRDF as the most "Ethiopia-oriented" party which betrays once again an obvious perception bias that will have to be addressed properly in the following³⁹. We must notice that the level of this highest percentage is paradoxically very low which may convey Ethiopians' scepticism at considering parties as truly "Ethiopia-oriented".

³⁹The percentage of people considering EDP as "Ethiopia-oriented" within each ethnic group is as follows: 41.5% within Amharas, 29% within Oromos, 38.5% within SNNPs and 23.9% within Tigreans.

OLF is characterized as "ethnic(ity)-oriented" by the highest percentage of respondents (71.2%). This is a unanimously shared perception among ethnic groups⁴⁰.

EPRDF is characterized as "vote-oriented" by the highest percentage of respondents (14.1%) which seems easily understandable since it actually implements targeted standard clientelistic policies as already mentioned. This is a unanimously shared perception among ethnic groups at the exception of Oromos who consider EDP (at a 13% level) as the most "vote-oriented" party⁴¹.

The "power-oriented" criterion is the third most frequently used one to characterise parties (it is used at least once by 37.4% of the respondents). As expected, EPRDF is considered as the most "power-oriented" party with 18.1% of the respondents qualifying it as such. This is a unanimously shared perception among ethnic groups at the exception once again of Tigreans who consider CAFPDE (at a 14.8% level) and its "coalition strategy" as the most power-oriented party⁴².

Finally, the very low percentage of people using at least once the "rich-oriented" and "poor-oriented" criteria confirm the irrelevancy of the "tax level" issue as regarding Ethiopian politics.

4.1.3 Perceived political landscape

We express graphically the respondents' perception of the Ethiopian political landscape by using the four most frequently mentioned criteria for party's characterization (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Perceived political landscape

On the horizontal axis, we represent the degree of ethnic clientelism (from the most ethnic clientelistic party to the least ethnic clientelistic party) by computing, for each party, the difference between the percentage of people who consider them as "Ethiopia-oriented" and of those who consider them as "ethnicity-oriented".

⁴⁰The percentage of people considering OLF as "ethnic(ity)-oriented" within each ethnic group is as follows: 68.5% within Amharas, 68.1% within Oromos, 76.9% within SNNPs and 75% within Tigreans.

⁴¹The percentage of people considering EPRDF as "vote-oriented" within each ethnic group is as follows: 13.1% within Amharas, 8.7% within Oromos, 9.1% within SNNPs and 17% within Tigreans.

⁴²The percentage of people considering EPRDF as "power-oriented" within each ethnic group is as follows: 16.9% within Amharas, 37.7% within Oromos, 33.3% within SNNPs and 3.4% within Tigreans.

On the vertical axis, we represent the degree of standard clientelism (from the most standard clientelistic party to the least standard clientelistic party) by computing, for each party, the difference between the percentage of people who consider them as "Ethiopia-oriented" and of those who consider them as "vote-oriented".

The "power-oriented" aspect of each party is betrayed by the size of the sphere defining its positioning on the figure.

As already emphasized, the horizontal axis dedicated to the degree of ethnic clientelism is the most informative.

It confirms that objectively "Ethiopia-oriented" parties are actually considered as such by the respondents (they are positioned on the right-hand side of the figure) with EDP embodying the most Ethiopia-oriented party of the list, followed by EDUP and CAFPDE that may appear more ambiguous.

Objectively "ethnic-oriented" parties are also perceived as such by the respondents (they are positioned on the left-hand side of the figure) with a ranking from the least "ethnic-oriented" to the most "ethnic-oriented" validating the predictions of our model. For the ethnic clientelistic policy to be incentive, we indeed demonstrated that: $\xi_4 < \xi_3 < \xi_1 < \xi_2$. Figure 1 shows that OLF and ONC are actually considered as the most "ethnic-oriented" parties, followed by AAPO, SEPDC, and EPRDF.

In the Appendix, we distinguish the perception of the Ethiopian political landscape according to the father's ethnicity of the respondents (see Figure VII.2., VII.3., VII.4. and VII.5.). We must first notice that each ethnic group characterizes objectively "Ethiopia-oriented" and objectively "ethnicity oriented" as such, at the blatant exception of Tigreans who, as already highlighted, totally mask, at purpose or not, the ethnicity-oriented character of EPRDF by considering it the most Ethiopia-oriented party of the political arena. Among Tigreans, the difference between those who consider the political parties as "Ethiopia-oriented" and those who consider them as "ethnicity oriented" is 53.4% for EPRDF and an average of only 6.8% for EDP, EDUP, and CAF-PDE. This further underlines Tigreans' very high bias in their perception of Ethiopian politics. As regarding the ranking of parties along the horizontal axis, we must also mention that it is identical across ethnic groups concerning Ethiopia-oriented parties.

Concerning ethnicity-oriented parties however, the figures show some obvious ethnic biases. Indeed, among southern ethnic groups (Oromos and SNNPs), the political party potentially embodying the secular oppression of northerners over southern regions (AAPO) is considered as more ethnic-oriented than it is on average. Reversely, among northern ethnic groups (Amharas and Tigreans), the positioning of AAPO on the horizontal axis is less ethnic oriented than it is on average.

4.2 Approval voting

The "approval voting" question is replicated in "Question IV.2."

Question IV.2.

For each of the following political parties, could you please indicate whether you would be happy or not if it came to win the 2005 national elections?

	Happy	Not happy	DK/NA
a. EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Republic Democratic Front).....			
b. AAPO (All Amhara People's Organisation).....			
c. SEPDC (Southern Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Coalition).....			
d. CAFPDE (Coalition of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia).....			
e. EDP (Ethiopian Democratic Party).....			
f. EDUP (Ethiopian Democratic Union Party).....			
g. ONC (Oromo National Congress).....			
h. OLF (Oromo Liberation Front).....			

[Please place a cross in the box of your choice for each proposition]

4.2.1 Descriptive statistics

People largely answered the approval voting question with only 6.1% of the respondents who chose the DK/NA option or left a blank for each party. This rate is roughly the same for each ethnic group except for SNNPs where abstentionists amount to 15.4% (the percentage of abstentionists among Amharas, Oromos and Tigreans are 7.4%, 5.2% and 2.3% respectively).

Among people who agreed to answer the approval voting game (306 respondents), the number of approved parties is reported in Figure 2. It shows that the modal number of approved parties per respondent is 1 (42.8% of the 306 respondents), while individuals who approved 2 and 3 parties stand for 18.3% and 16% of the 306 respondents respectively.

In the following, we analyse the percentage of approvals obtained by each political party; we then set the "association matrix" showing the percentage of people who approved party x and party y at the same time. Such an information is very precious: first, it leads to analyse the characteristics of people giving their approval to more than one party; second, on the basis of a "Principal Component Analysis", it enables to represent graphically the political distance between parties.




Figure 2: Number of approved parties per questionnaire

Approval voting results Would the 326 respondents be totally egoist, we would expect that approvals be concentrated on ethnic-based parties, with all Tigreans approving EPRDF (27% of approvals), all Oromos approving ONC

or OLF (21.2% of the approvals), all Amharas approving AAPO (39.8% of approvals) and all SNNPs approving SEPDC and CAFPDE (12% of the approvals). This would mean that AAPO "wins" the approval voting, followed by EPRDF, ONC/OLF and SEPDC/CAFPDE. The actual results of each political party is given in Table 7.

	Number				% of approvals		
	Yes	No	DK/NA	Yes+No	Total	All sample*	Yes+No**
EPRDF	143	120	63	263	326	43.9	54.4
AAPO	54	157	115	211	326	16.6	25.6
SEPDC	33	144	149	177	326	10.1	18.6
CAFPDE	73	116	137	189	326	22.4	38.6
EDP	128	87	111	215	326	39.3	59.5
EDUP	84	117	125	201	326	25.8	41.8
ONC	26	192	108	218	326	8.0	11.9
OLF	24	223	79	247	326	7.4	9.7

*the 326 respondents

**only those who answered "yes" or "no"

Table 7: Approval voting results

When one considers the rough count of approvals, EPRDF wins the elections. We deeply analyse the determinants of approving EPRDF in the following. However, we can already give two possible explanations.

The first one may be that EPRDF is the only party which has been ruling Ethiopia so far justifying that people may consider that there is no alternative to EPRDF. In appendix, descriptive statistics related to question VII.7. show that almost one third of respondents (32.2%) consider that there is no credible opposition parties (42% for Tigreans, 30.8% for SNNPs, 29% for Oromos and 27.7% for Amharas).

The second possible incentive to approve EPRDF lies in the fact that, though the improvement of economic conditions remain unachieved⁴³, EPRDF yet managed to improve these issues since the early 90s. This is widely felt by respondents. Indeed, if only 27.6% of respondents consider that EPRDF managed to create growth, 62% acknowledge that it improved people's access to crucial public goods like health services and education (see question VII.8. and the related statistics in the Appendix).

However, what is surprising is that parties that arrive second, third, and fourth in the approval voting experiment are all Ethiopia-oriented (they are EDP, EDUP and CAFPDE respectively). AAPO which could have been the winner of the approval voting experiment in a purely egoistic voting scenario arrives only fifth, with 16.6% of approvals. The predominance of Ethiopia-oriented parties and specially EDP which is perceived as the most Ethiopia-oriented one is further enhanced when one considers the percentage of approvals for each political party over the number of people who expressed their opinion (they approved or disapproved). Indeed, EDP then wins the approval voting game, collecting almost 60% of approvals. This reflects that political voting may not be totally determined by self-interest contrary to what is commonly assumed in the literature on political economy.

Approval voting results for each ethnic group are reported in appendix (see Tables VII.10., VII.11., VII.12. and VII.13.). We notice that the ethnic bias is particularly vivid for Tigreans and Oromos. Indeed, both of these ethnic groups

⁴³The statistics related to Question VII.1.e (see Table VII.1.e in Appendix) show that respondents are unanimously aware of Ethiopian poor economic conditions since 78.8% disagree or strongly disagree with the statement: "Everybody has access to basic necessities (food, water...)" (82.3% for Amharas, 88.4% for Oromos, 79.5% for SNNPs, and 65.9% for Tigreans).

mainly approve their ethnic party with 86.4% of Tigreans approving EPRDF and 33.3% of Oromos approving OLF (the ethnic bias within Tigreans is thus much higher than within Oromos). Such ethnic biases confirm our intuition that altruistic voting is more costly for them.

Indeed, the first ones are benefiting from the current ruling party which restored the dominant position they had during Aksumite times. Among those who are conscious of such an advantage, the cost of having Ethiopia-oriented parties elected would be very high. Moreover, one should add to these clear-minded privileged people those (a majority of Tigreans) who consider EPRDF as Ethiopia-oriented. This short-seeing perception may be affected and only a mean for Tigreans to have good conscience. It may also be sincere. Indeed, being in a more favourable position than one's fellow citizens sometimes lead to considerably underestimate this discrepancy in terms of well-being.

As for Oromos, they may have the possibility, by seceding, of remaining self-sufficient (we already talked about Oromia as the storehouse of Ethiopia) or at least not worse off than what they currently are under EPRDF's discriminatory allocation of public good. The cost for them to renounce such an egoistic strategy may thus be particularly high as it is the case for Tigreans. Yet, contrary to Tigreans, the egoistic option consisting in favouring OLF is chosen by only one third of Oromos. Moreover, one should notice that the party that arrives second both within Oromos and Tigreans is EDP. As for Tigreans, the difference of approvals between EPRDF and EDP remains high (86.4% for EPRDF against 27.3% for EDP). But this difference is almost null in the case of Oromos (33.3% for OLF against 31.9% for EDP).

The ethnic bias is not as high on the part of Amharas and SNNPs. In each of these groups, EDP wins the election collecting 51.5% of approvals among Amhara people and 38.5% among SNNPs. More ethnic-oriented parties arrive fourth and fifth respectively (after EDP, EDUP, CAFPDE in the case of Amhara and after EDP, EPRDF, EDUP and CAFPDE in the case of SNNPs). This predominance of Ethiopia-oriented parties among Amharas and SNNPs may perhaps come from the fact that favouring an Ethiopia-oriented party compared to an ethnic-based one does not represent that a high cost for them.

Indeed, in the case of Amharas, AAPO also favours the unity of Ethiopia. Moreover, though agreeing for decentralisation, Ethiopia-oriented parties are strongly opposed to ethnic federalism. Having them in power would already be a step for Amharas towards a recuperation of their dominant role.

As regarding SNNPs, the sacrifice is also very low. Indeed, SEPDC fights for a recognition of southern minorities which means for an equal treatment between them and the rest of Ethiopia. It would certainly not be realistic to expect more (i.e: a favoured treatment compared to the rest of Ethiopia). SNNPs may thus be indifferent between voting for SEPDC and voting for an Ethiopia-oriented party.

We confirm the intensity of such ethnic biases by relying on a probit analysis (see Table 8) from question IV.2 where the dependent variables are dummies defining the probability of approving each of the five ethnicity-oriented parties that we explain through the ethnic group of the respondent (the explanatory dummies take the value 1 if the respondent belongs to the specified ethnic group, and 0 otherwise)⁴⁴. It appears that the ethnic bias is the highest among Tigreans and Oromos and the lowest among Amharas and SNNPs even though the very ambiguous character of SEPDC does not yield a significant coefficient.

⁴⁴In each case, we restrict observations to people who were able to characterize (whatever the criterion used) the party under consideration so as to neglect "unaware" people who may have answered the "approval voting" question at random.

Dependent variable: the dummy "approves..."					
	...EPRDF"	...SEPDC"	...AAPO"	...ONC"	...OLF"
constant	-0.342***	-1.007***	-1.238***	-1.905***	-2.537***
tigrean	1.962***				
snp		0.332			
amhara			1.037***		
oromo				1.832***	2.509***
Number of obs	248	137	171	175	224
LR chi2(n)	84.52	0.80	22.38	40.98	73.53
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.3723	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.2472	0.0064	0.1203	0.3295	0.4959

*significant at a 10% level
**significant at a 5% level
***significant at a 1% level

Table 8: Ethnic bias' impact on the probability of approving ethnicity-oriented parties

However, whatever the degree of sacrifice for approving an Ethiopia-oriented party, it does exist for all ethnic groups. Indeed, for some of them, it takes the form of an indisputable material sacrifice compared to the option proposed by their ethnic group (Tigreans and Oromos). For all, renouncing of being represented by people from one's ethnic group may be already a psychologic sacrifice as already emphasized and validated through the "trust" question. Yet, Ethiopia-oriented parties win the approval voting among Amharas and SNNPs and arrive second among Oromos (almost ex aequo with OLF) and Tigreans. This may be interpreted as a pure expression of ethical altruism. We must however test the existence of such an ethical altruism more rigorously by relying on a probit analysis.

Association matrix The association matrix shows the percentage of people who approved candidate x and candidate y at the same time. The association matrix related to the 326 observations of our sample is given in Table 9.

%	EPRDF	AAPO	SEPDC	CAFPDE	EDP	EDUP	ONC	OLF
EPRDF	43.9	6.4	4.9	9.2	14.1	10.4	1.8	0.6
AAPO	6.4	16.6	5.5	7.7	10.7	8.3	1.2	0.3
SEPDC	4.9	5.5	10.1	6.1	5.8	4.9	2.5	0.9
CAFPDE	9.2	7.7	6.1	22.4	15.3	10.7	2.8	0.9
EDP	14.1	10.7	5.8	15.3	39.3	21.2	2.8	1.2
EDUP	10.4	8.3	4.9	10.7	21.2	25.8	2.5	0.6
ONC	1.8	1.2	2.5	2.8	2.8	2.5	8.0	4.0
OLF	0.6	0.3	0.9	0.9	1.2	0.6	4.0	7.4

Table 9: Association matrix

Ethnic characteristics of people approving more than 1 party We distinguish three kinds of parties: ethnicity-oriented parties, Ethiopia-oriented parties and EPRDF (we isolate EPRDF from the other ethnicity-oriented parties due to its controversial status -a large majority of Tigreans consider it as the most Ethiopia-oriented party of the political landscape). We report in Table 10 the percentage of people approving only or more than one kind of party.

	Those who gave at least 1 approval		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Only Ethiopia-oriented parties	63	23.0	38	34.9	12	20.7	12	44.4	1	1.3
Only EPRDF	74	27.0	13	11.9	5	8.6	7	25.9	49	61.3
Only ethnicity-oriented parties*	30	10.9	10	9.2	19	32.8	1	3.7	0	0.0
Ethiopia-oriented parties and EPRDF	40	14.6	14	12.8	5	8.6	2	7.4	19	23.8
Ethiopia-oriented and ethnicity-oriented parties	38	13.9	20	18.3	12	20.7	3	11.1	3	3.8
Ethnicity-oriented parties and EPRDF	6	2.2	2	1.8	2	3.4	0	0.0	2	2.5
Ethiopia-oriented, ethnicity-oriented parties and EPRDF	23	8.4	12	11.0	3	5.2	2	7.4	6	7.5
TOTAL	274	100.0	109	100.0	58	100.0	27	100.0	80	100.0

*other than EPRDF

Table 10: Ethnic characteristics of people approving only one or more than one kind of party

One must first emphasize the high proportion of Amharas (34.9%) and SNNPs (44.4%) but the dramatically low percentage of Tigreans (1.3%) approving only Ethiopia-oriented parties. Second, the strong ethnic withdrawal among Tigreans and Oromos is once again very perceptible since 61.3% of Tigreans approve only EPRDF, and 32.8% of Oromos approve only ethnicity-oriented parties (ONC and OLF). Third, the assimilation of EPRDF with Ethiopia-oriented parties among Tigreans is again revealed since they are the most numerous (23.8%) to approve EPRDF and Ethiopia-oriented parties at the same time.

Bi-dimensional representation of the political distance between parties We obtain it thanks to a principal component analysis of the association matrix (see Figure 3). It must be interpreted as follows: two candidates are closer on this figure if the approvals they collected are more strongly correlated.




Figure 3: Bi-dimensional representation of political distance between parties

The results confirm the intuitions that we developed so far. It appears that Ethiopian politics can be considered as organised around three poles: the first one is the pole of Ethiopia-oriented parties formed by EDP, EDUP CAFPDE, as well as two ethnic parties which, as already mentioned, may be considered as not so remote from truly "Ethiopia-oriented" parties: AAPO and SEPDC. The second and third poles are the two currently competing ethnic groups with Oromos represented by ONC and OLF on a first hand, and Tigreans represented by EPRDF on a second hand. In such a setting, the extreme points of each category which are OLF, EPRDF, and EDP seem equidistant, forming like an equilateral triangle.

4.2.2 Testing the existence and influence of ethical altruism

Our objective is here to test our predictions on approval voting by relying on a probit analysis. We first define the explanatory variables that seem relevant for regressions, among which the "ethical altruism" variable. We then implement

a probit analysis⁴⁵ by relying on a first specification. We finally refine this first specification and test our predictions again.

Explanatory variables

The "ethical altruism" dummy It must betray people's efforts to mobilise against the inequality of treatment between Ethiopian citizens implemented by EPRDF without making this mobilisation coincide with the support towards a favourable ethnicity-oriented party (in such a case, the mobilisation would merely consist in replacing one ethnic oppression by another one). We build our "ethical altruism" variable from two questions of our survey.

The first question (see "Question IV.3.g.") measures the mobilisation degree of the respondent against the inequality of treatment between Ethiopian citizens implemented by EPRDF. We create a dummy that we call "mobilization against inequality". We suppose that it takes the value 0 when the respondent chooses the option "support the government" or "nothing", and the value 1 when he chooses the option "Support an opposition party", or "Boycott elections", or "Join a protest" (we treat people who didn't answer the question or who chose the "DK/NA" option as missing values). The breakdown of the "mobilisation against inequality" dummy along ethnic lines is reported in Appendix (see Table VII.14.). The average proportion of people ready to fight for more equitable treatment between various interest groups is high: 77.3%. Oromos are the most revolted respondents (84.1% are mobilised against inequality), while SNNPs are the least mobilised ones (66.7% are mobilised against inequality), perhaps because this patchwork of ethnic groups is uneasy to federate and thus more submitted to individualistic behaviors.

Question IV.3.

What would you be willing to do if the government took any of the following actions?

	Support the government	Nothing	Support an opposition party	Boycott elections	Join a protest	DK/NA
a. Prevented opposition parties from participating in elections.....						
b. Committed into electoral fraud.....						
c. Forced people to vote for it.....						
d. Didn't provide enough food to everybody						
e. Violated human rights.....						
f. Didn't maintain peace and order in the country.....						
g. Distributed the wealth of the country only to those who strongly support him or who belong to the same ethnic group or economic class, at the detriment of other Ethiopian people.....						

[Please place a cross in the box of your choice for each proposition]

The second question (see "Question IV.4.") determines whether the respondent uses its ethnic group as a negotiation tool in the political arena. We create a dummy that we call "no politicization of ethnicity" from "Question IV.4.". We suppose that it takes the value 0 if the respondent circled the option "People belonging to the same ethnic group as you", and the value 1 if the respondent circled other options (we treat people who didn't answer the question or who circled the "DK/NA" option as missing values). The breakdown of the "no politicization of ethnicity" dummy along ethnic lines is reported in Appendix (see Table VII.15.). It shows that a high proportion (81%) of respondents do not consider to have major interests to be defended with people from the same

⁴⁵We use Stata 8.0 software.

ethnic group. This proportion is the lowest among Oromos (66.7%) and the highest among SNNPs (92.3%).

Question IV.4.

With which of the following groups do you consider to share the highest number of interests to be POLITICALLY DEFENDED? You can circle more than 1 answer.

- a. Nobody
 - b. Your family/clan
 - c. People living in the same kebele/woreda as you
 - d. People belonging to the same ethnic group as you
 - e. People having the same religion as you
 - f. People speaking the same language as you
 - g. People having the same living conditions as you
 - h. People belonging to the same economic class as you (farmer, working class, middle class, well-educated...etc)
 - i. People sharing the same vision of the world as you
 - j. All people living in Ethiopia
 - k. I don't know or don't wish to answer
- (Please circle your choice(s))*

We infer the dummy "ethical altruism" from the two dummies "mobilisation against inequality" and "no politicization of ethnic group". We suppose that it takes the value 1 if the individual both mobilizes against inequality of treatment among citizens and refuses to instrumentalise his ethnic group for defending his interest on the political scene. It takes the value 0 in the other case. The breakdown of the "ethical altruism" dummy along ethnic lines is reported in Appendix (see Table VII.16.). 63.5% of respondents appear to deserve the "ethical altruist" qualification, with no major variations along ethnic groups at the exception of Oromos who are less ethical altruist than the others (53.6% for Oromos against 67.7% for Amharas, 64.1% for SNNPs, and 64.8% for Tigreans). The high proportion of ethical altruists among Tigreans sounds suspect since, like Oromos, being ethical altruist is very costly for them. We will certainly have to "refine" our "ethical altruism" dummy to distinguish between "genuine" and "fake" ethical altruists.

The "Ethiopia must remain unified" dummy ("ethiounified") In addition to ethical altruism, the desire to see Ethiopia remain unified may play a great role in the decision of individuals of approving or voting for Ethiopia-oriented parties rather than ethnicity-oriented parties. We draw a dummy "Ethiopia must remain unified" from "Question IV.5.". We assume that it takes the value 1 if the respondent answered "Only agree with A and not at all with B", and that it takes the value 0 in the other case (we treat people who didn't answer the question or who circled the "DK/NA" option as missing values). The breakdown of the dummy along ethnic lines is reported in Appendix (see Table VII.17.). 45.7% of respondents consider that Ethiopia must remain unified, which is constant across ethnic groups at the exception once again of Oromos whose secessionist incentives are well-known (29% for Oromos, against 48.5% for Amharas, 48.7% for SNNPs, and 53.4% for Tigreans).

Question IV.5.

Please read the two following statements:

Statement A: "Even if there are conflicts among different groups, Ethiopia should remain united as one country"

Statement B: "The differences among Ethiopians are too strong: for the sake of peace, the country should be broken apart"

Could you please indicate in the following chart which of these 2 statements (A or B) you most agree with?

Only agree with A and not at all with B	Much more agree with A than with B	More agree with A than with B	Agree as much with A as with B	More agree with B than with A	Much more agree with B than with A	Only agree with B and not at all with A

(Please place a cross in the box of your choice or leave a blank if you don't know or don't wish to answer)

Other explanatory variables We create a dummy for each ethnic group (it takes the value 1 if the respondent belongs to the ethnic group under consideration, and 0 in the other case).

We also set a "no credible alternative" dummy ("nocredibleopp") from question VII.7. (see Appendix). We assume that it takes the value 1 if the respondent answered "Rather no" or "Not at all", and that it takes the value 0 if he answered "Yes, very much" or "Yes, to some extent".

We finally build a dummy showing whether the respondent considers that EPRDF improved economic conditions or not (see question VII.8. and the related statistics in the Appendix). We call it the "economic conditions improved" dummy (or "betterecocond"). It takes the value 1 if he finds that EPRDF was able to create growth or improved Ethiopians' access to crucial public goods (it is equal to 0 in the other case).

Probit analysis: specification I We implement a probit analysis in order to test the predictions of our model regarding the determinants of approving Ethiopia-oriented parties and ethnicity-oriented parties. In each case, we restrict observations to people who were able to characterize (whatever the criterion used) the party under consideration so as to neglect "unaware" people who may have answered the "approval voting" question at random.

Ethiopia-oriented parties We create two types of dependent variables. The first one is a general dummy that takes the value 1 if the respondent approves at least one of the three Ethiopia-oriented parties which are EDP, EDUP, and CAFPDE (it takes the value 0 otherwise). The second ones are party specific (they take the value 1 if the Ethiopia-oriented party under consideration was approved and 0 if not)⁴⁶.

According to our model, we know that Ethiopia-oriented parties must be approved by strongly ethical altruistic people and disapproved by strongly egoistic people. This particularly means that the coefficient of the "ethical altruism" dummy must be positive. Moreover, we expect that the coefficient of the:

- "nontigrean" dummy be positive (we assume that it takes the value 1 if the respondent is Oromo, Amhara, or SNNP and 0 if the respondent is Tigrean): indeed, Tigreans may be reluctant at losing their political supremacy while non Tigreans may be satisfied to have an impartial political party elected
- "ethiounified" dummy be positive since people who care of the Ethiopian unity may consider that parties favouring non discriminatory politics are more likely to strengthen it than ethnicity-oriented parties that triggers off conflict and division among Ethiopian citizens
- "nocredibleopp" dummy be negative (for obvious reasons)
- "betterecocond" dummy be negative

The results of the probit analysis are reported in Table 11.

⁴⁶Here again, we consider people who didn't answer the question or who chose the DK/NA option as "missing" values.

Dependent variable: the dummy "approves at least one Ethiopia-oriented party"						Dependent variable: the dummy "approves EDUP"					
	Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5		Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5
constant	0.025	-0.602**	-0.760***	-0.827***	-0.553	constant	-0.484**	-1.087***	-1.451***	-1.511***	-1.551***
eth. altruism	0.674***	0.772***	0.724***	0.825***	0.818***	eth. altruism	0.593**	0.691***	0.647**	0.687**	0.691**
nontigrean		0.791***	0.808***	0.913***	0.811***	nontigrean		0.766***	0.816***	0.888***	0.916***
ethiounified			0.412***	0.348**	0.365	ethiounified			0.721***	0.844***	0.885***
nocredibleopp				-0.119	-0.136	nocredibleopp				-0.548**	-0.531*
betterecocond					-0.296	betterecocond					-0.038
-----						-----					
Number of obs.	183	183	181	169	165	Number of obs.	127	127	125	117	113
LR chi2(n)	10.12	22.83	25.68	28.16	29.24	LR chi2(n)	5.45	14.76	22.92	27.99	28.73
Prob > chi2	0.0015	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	Prob > chi2	0.0196	0.0006	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.0446	0.1005	0.1147	0.1339	0.1433	Pseudo R2	0.0310	0.0839	0.1324	0.1741	0.1852
-----						-----					
Dependent variable: the dummy "approves EDP"						Dependent variable: the dummy "approves CAFPDE"					
	Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5		Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5
constant	-0.172	-0.785***	-1.033***	-0.900***	-0.715*	constant	-0.431*	-0.772**	-0.797**	-0.701*	-0.459
eth. altruism	0.726***	0.805***	0.743***	0.770***	0.755***	eth. altruism	0.353	0.409	0.374	0.364	0.325
nontigrean		0.766***	0.822***	0.831***	0.757***	nontigrean		0.409	0.405	0.379	0.277
ethiounified			0.575**	0.510**	0.526**	ethiounified			0.095	0.093	0.090
nocredibleopp				-0.358	-0.367	nocredibleopp				-0.214	-0.246
betterecocond					-0.196	betterecocond					-0.185
-----						-----					
Number of obs.	151	151	149	141	137	Number of obs.	111	111	110	106	104
LR chi2(n)	10.16	20.01	25.44	26.37	26.94	LR chi2(n)	1.67	3.87	3.66	4.21	4.46
Prob > chi2	0.0014	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	Prob > chi2	0.1958	0.1442	0.3007	0.3782	0.4848
Pseudo R2	0.0510	0.1005	0.1296	0.1413	0.1489	Pseudo R2	0.0110	0.0255	0.0244	0.0291	0.0314

*significant at a 10% level
**significant at a 5% level
***significant at a 1% level

Table 11: Determinants of the probability of approving Ethiopia-oriented parties

We note that the predicted signs of the various coefficients are always valuated. Moreover, the coefficients of the dummies "ethical altruism", "nontigrean", "ethiounified" are very significant as regarding the probability of approving at least one Ethiopia-oriented party, EDP, or EDUP. The significance of the coefficients considerably decreases as regarding the probability of approving CAFPDE. This may first and foremost come from the ambiguous character of this multi-ethnic party that some may hesitate to characterize as truly "Ethiopia-oriented" or truly "ethnicity-oriented"⁴⁷. As regarding the role of ethical altruism, it is interesting to note that it is even greater that the party under consideration is more clearly Ethiopia-oriented. In the specification taking all explanatory variables into account ("probit 5"), the coefficient of the dummy "ethical altruism" is 0.755 for EDP, 0.691 for EDUP, and 0.325 for CAFPDE.

Ethnicity-oriented parties Each dependent variable takes the value 1 if the ethnicity-oriented party under consideration is approved and 0 if not⁴⁸.

According to our model, we know that ethnicity-oriented parties must be disapproved by strongly ethical altruistic people and strongly egoistic people when they do not belong to the favoured ethnic group; they must be approved by strongly egoistic people when they do belong to the favoured ethnic group. This particularly means that the coefficient of the "ethical altruism" dummy

⁴⁷We notice that the Chi2 test doesn't reject the hypothesis that all coefficients are null as for CAFPDE.

⁴⁸Here again, we consider people who didn't answer the question or who chose the DK/NA option as "missing" values.

must be negative and that the coefficient of the dummy "favoured ethnic group" must be positive. Moreover, we expect that the coefficient of the:

- "ethiounified" dummy be negative
- "nocredibleopp" dummy be negative except for EPRDF where it should be positive
- "betterecocond" variable be positive for EPRDF but negative for other ethnicity-oriented parties

If these predictions should be easily verified concerning ONC and OLF which are unambiguously considered as "ethnicity-oriented" parties among ethnic groups, it will certainly be more problematic as regarding EPRDF, SEPDC, and AAPO. Concerning EPRDF, due to the perception bias among Tigreans (and, more generally, among its proponents) who consider it as an Ethiopia-oriented party, ethical altruistic proponents of EPRDF may massively decide to approve it, potentially reversing the expected sign of the "ethical altruism" variable. Concerning SEPDC, its struggle for the recognition of historically dominated southern minorities may be considered as fair and ethical altruists may be in favour of its political platform (the ability of this party to defend besides a privileged position for SNNPs being rather unrealistic). Concerning AAPO, though the rejection of any kind of federalism may betray its will to restaure the centralized Shoa administration, it may also be considered as expressing AAPO's mere will to refuse any kind of discrimination along ethnic lines, and thus to promote equality of treatment between Ethiopian citizens. AAPO may thus be approved by some ethical altruists.

The results of the probit analysis as regarding ethnicity-oriented parties are reported in Table 12.

Dependent variable: the dummy "approves EPRDF"					
	Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5
constant	-0.293*	-0.823***	-0.788***	-0.975***	-2.079***
eth. altruism	0.482***	0.576***	0.577***	0.678***	0.910***
tigrean		2.025***	2.044***	2.000***	1.980***
ethiounified			-0.109	-0.174	-0.225
nocredibleopp				0.555**	0.811***
betterecocond					1.380***
Number of obs.	225	225	223	203	198
LR chi2(n)	6.75	85.72	85.31	85.18	117.51
Prob > chi2	0.0094	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.0217	0.2751	0.2761	0.3031	0.4284

Dependent variable: the dummy "approves SEPDC"					
	Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5
constant	-0.986***	-1.006***	-0.981***	-0.994***	-0.752**
eth. altruism	0.011	0.004	0.022	-0.002	-0.025
snp		0.211	0.197	0.040	0.026
ethiounified			-0.069	-0.116	-0.101
nocredibleopp				0.124	0.110
betterecocond					-0.344
Number of obs.	128	128	127	120	117
LR chi2(n)	0.00	0.27	0.32	0.38	1.77
Prob > chi2	0.9704	0.8731	0.9556	0.9844	0.8802
Pseudo R2	0.0000	0.0024	0.0028	0.0036	0.0170

Dependent variable: the dummy "approves AAPO"					
	Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5
constant	-0.842***	-1.262***	-1.294***	-1.246***	-1.103***
eth. altruism	0.139	0.033	0.001	-0.036	-0.016
amhara		1.000***	0.967***	0.872***	0.879***
ethiounified			0.133	0.140	0.760
nocredibleopp				-0.022	0.012
betterecocond					-0.282
Number of obs.	157	157	155	146	141
LR chi2(n)	0.31	19.14	18.01	13.73	14.11
Prob > chi2	0.5762	0.0001	0.0004	0.0082	0.0149
Pseudo R2	0.0018	0.1132	0.1088	0.0909	0.0985

Dependent variable: the dummy "approves ONC"					
	Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5
constant	-0.726***	-1.499***	-1.319***	-1.499***	-1.144***
eth. altruism	-0.753***	-0.589*	-0.540	-0.386	-0.303
oromo		1.813***	1.784***	1.901***	1.881***
ethiounified			-0.484	-0.376	-0.389
nocredibleopp				-0.120	-0.112
betterecocond					-0.776**
Number of obs.	162	162	160	149	146
LR chi2(n)	7.89	42.96	44.59	44.13	45.05
Prob > chi2	0.0050	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.0674	0.3668	0.3824	0.4018	0.4288

Dependent variable: the dummy "approves OLF"					
	Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5
constant	-0.595***	-1.970***	-1.687***	-1.871***	-1.491**
eth. altruism	-1.230***	-1.727***	-1.965***	-2.046***	-1.930***
oromo		2.944***	3.338***	3.321***	3.159***
ethiounified			-1.456***	-1.320**	-1.185**
nocredibleopp				0.555	0.449
betterecocond					-0.562
Number of obs.	205	205	203	189	185
LR chi2(n)	23.51	86.28	94.80	90.73	87.04
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1735	0.6369	0.7020	0.7108	0.7108

Table 12: Determinants of the probability of approving ethnicity-oriented parties

Our doubts regarding the validation of predictions as regarding EPRDF, SEPDC, and AAPO are totally justified. First, the sign of the coefficient of the "ethical altruism" dummy is positive and very significant regarding the probability of approving EPRDF. Second, no coefficients are significant as regarding the probability of approving SEPDC (except the coefficient of the constant) which seems very difficult to specify (the Chi2 test does not reject that all coefficients are null). Moreover, the sign of the coefficient of the "ethical altruism" dummy oscillates between positivity (probit 1, 2 and 3) and negativity (probit 4 and 5). Third, the same remarks can be applied to the probability of approving AAPO, although the significativity slightly improves.

Yet, the predictions are strongly validated for ONC and OLF. There is however one anomaly regarding the sign of the "nocredibleopp" variable in the OLF regression. However, this anomaly seems easily understandable if one refers to the clearly secessionist ambition of OLF. Indeed, if people who approve OLF consider that there is no party able to implement a better policy than that of EPRDF within unified Ethiopia, they may then be even more incited to approve secession and thus OLF.

Probit analysis: specification II and III We here try to develop a more subtle specification for explaining the probability of approving EPRDF so as to correct the strong perception bias prevailing among EPRDF's supporters.

We must thus distinguish between ethical altruists who are clear-minded in their perception of EPRDF (they consider it as ethnicity-oriented) and those who are biased in their perception of EPRDF (they consider it as Ethiopia-oriented). We create a dummy for each case. The expected sign of such dummies should be negative and positive respectively.

We then create two other dummies. A dummy "not ethical altruist and non Tigrean" if the individual isn't Tigrean and does not appear as ethical altruist, and the dummy "not ethical altruist and Tigrean" if the individual is Tigrean and does not appear as ethical altruist. The expected sign of such dummies should be negative and positive respectively.

The results of the new probit specification are reported in Table 13. Our predictions are validated with highly significant coefficients.

	Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4
constant	0.056	0.028	-0.080	-1.027***
eth. altruism & eprdf as "ethnicity-oriented"	-0.591**	-0.557**	-0.562**	-0.460
eth. altruism & eprdf as "ethiopia-oriented"	1.270***	1.293***	1.216***	1.212***
not eth. altruist & nontigrean	-0.798***	-0.766***	-0.911***	-1.025***
not eth. altruist & tigrean	0.873**	0.906**	0.822*	0.690
ethiounified		-0.011	-0.097	-0.152
nocredibleopp			0.677***	0.882***
betterecocond				1.348***

Number of obs.	225	223	203	198
LR chi2(n)	77.74	76.63	77.87	114.35
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.2495	0.2480	0.2771	0.4169

*significant at a 10% level

**significant at a 5% level

***significant at a 1% level

Table 13: Determinants of the probability of approving EPRDF: specification II

This motivates us to divide our sample into three categories. First, we divide it between ethical altruists and the others that we qualify as "not ethical altruists". We then distinguish among ethical altruists between those who are "biased" (they qualify EPRDF as "Ethiopia-oriented") and those who are "unbiased" (they do not qualify EPRDF as "Ethiopia-oriented"). Among biased ethical altruists, we expect to find a great majority of Tigreans as well as a smaller percentage of people belonging to other ethnic groups (they may be the ones who benefit from EPRDF's targeted standard clientelism). Among privileged people from other ethnic groups we expect a predominance of the other northern ethnic group (Amharas) compared to southern ethnic groups (Oromos and SNNPs) due to already mentioned historical reasons.

The breakdown of our sample (reduced to 285 observations due to missing values) along both ethnic and "ethical" lines (taking our splitting into egoists, biased and unbiased ethical altruists) is reported in Table 14. Our predictions regarding the predominance of Tigreans and, to some extent, Amharas within biased ethical altruists are validated.

	Biased eth. altruists		Non biased eth. altruists		Egoists		TOTAL
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	
Amharas	17	27.0	69	49.3	28	34.1	114
Oromos	3	4.8	33	23.6	25	30.5	61
SNNPs	3	4.8	21	15.0	9	11.0	33
Tigreans	40	63.5	17	12.1	20	24.4	77
TOTAL	63	100.0	140	100.0	82	100.0	285

Table 14: Sample's breakdown along ethnic and ethical lines

On this basis, we implement a third probit analysis for explaining the probability of approving EPRDF. We create a dummy "biased ethical altruist" and a dummy "Tigrean and not ethical altruist". We expect that the coefficient of these dummies be both positive. The results of our probit analysis are given in Table 15. Our predictions are once again validated with highly significant coefficients.

	Probit 1	Probit 2	Probit 3	Probit 4	Probit 5
constant	-0.301***	-0.437***	-0.427***	-0.61***	-1.482***
biased eth. altruism	1.582***	1.718***	1.731***	1.714***	1.689***
tigrean & not eth. altruist		1.366***	1.377***	1.353***	1.211***
ethiounified			-0.053	-0.119	-0.171
nocredibleopp				0.667***	0.811***
betterecocond					1.290***
.....					
Number of obs.	225	225	223	203	198
LR chi2(n)	53.11	68.76	68.64	68.22	104.48
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1705	0.2207	0.2222	0.2428	0.3809

Table 15: Determinants of the probability of approving EPRDF: specification III

4.3 Voting

The "voting" question is replicated in "Question IV.6."⁴⁹

Question IV.6.

- Which party do you support?
- EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front)
 - AAPO (All Amhara People's Organisation)
 - SEPPDC (Southern Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Coalition)
 - CAPPDE (Coalition of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia)
 - EDP (Ethiopian Democracy Party)
 - EDUP (Ethiopian Democratic Union Party)
 - ONC (Oromo National Congress)
 - OLF (Oromo Liberation Front)
 - Other, namely.....
 - I feel close to no party
 - I don't know or don't wish to answer
- [Please circle your choice and fill in the blank if your answer is "h"]*

4.3.1 Descriptive statistics

Only 52.45% of the 326 respondents declared to support one party (among which 32.7% of Amharas, 21.1% of Oromos, 8.8% of SNNPs, and 37.4% of Tigreans)⁵⁰. The number of votes thus amounts to 171. In Table 16, we cross the voting results with ethnicity and ethical categories successively.

⁴⁹Only one respondent circled answer "i" and gave the name of an Eritrean party called EPPF.

⁵⁰8 respondents declared to support more than one party, but we do not take them into account due to their low number.

	171 observations		Tigreans		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
EPRDF	85	49.7	58	90.6	17	30.4	6	16.7	4	26.7
AAPO	9	5.3	1	1.6	8	14.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
SEPDC	2	1.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	13.3
CAFPDE	7	4.1	1	1.6	4	7.1	1	2.8	1	6.7
EDP	30	17.5	0	0.0	19	33.9	6	16.7	5	33.3
EDUP	16	9.4	4	6.3	7	12.5	3	8.3	2	13.3
ONC	4	2.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	8.3	1	6.7
OLF	18	10.5	0	0.0	1	1.8	17	47.2	0	0.0
TOTAL	171	100.0	64	100.0	56	100.0	36	100.0	15	100.0
Ethnicity-oriented	33	19.3	1	1.6	9	16.1	20	55.6	3	20.0
EPRDF	85	49.7	58	90.6	17	30.4	6	16.7	4	26.7
Ethiopia-oriented	53	31.0	5	7.8	30	53.6	10	27.8	8	53.3
TOTAL	171	100.0	64	100.0	56	100.0	36	100.0	15	100.0

	157 observations		Biased eth. altruists		Unbiased eth. altruists		Not eth. altruists	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
EPRDF	75	47.8	39	81.3	17	29.3	19	37.3
AAPO	8	5.1	2	4.2	2	3.4	4	7.8
SEPDC	2	1.3	0	0.0	2	3.4	0	0.0
CAFPDE	7	4.5	0	0.0	6	10.3	1	2.0
EDP	28	17.8	2	4.2	19	32.8	7	13.7
EDUP	16	10.2	4	8.3	8	13.8	4	7.8
ONC	4	2.5	0	0.0	1	1.7	3	5.9
OLF	17	10.8	1	2.1	3	5.2	13	25.5
TOTAL	157	100.0	48	100.0	58	100.0	51	100.0
Ethnicity-oriented	31	19.7	3	6.3	8	13.8	20	39.2
EPRDF	75	47.8	39	81.3	17	29.3	19	37.3
Ethiopia-oriented	51	32.5	6	12.5	33	56.9	12	23.5
TOTAL	157	100.0	48	100.0	58	100.0	51	100.0

Table 16: Breakdown of voting results along ethnic and ethical lines

The ethnic bias is once again clear (at least for parties collecting a high number of votes), as shown in Table 17.

Dependent variable: the dummy 'votes for...

	...EPRDF*	...AAPO*	...ONC*	...OLF*
constant	-1.173***	-2.468***	-2.543***	-2.594***
tigrean	1.673***			
amhara		1.120***		
oromo			0.998**	2.014***
Remark: "snp=1" predicts failure perfectly as regarding the probability of voting for SEPDC				
Number of obs	297	237	231	268
LR chi2(n)	91.05	10.56	5.41	46.29
Prob > chi2	0.0000	0.0012	0.0201	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.2602	0.1380	0.1339	0.3655

*significant at a 10% level

**significant at a 5% level

***significant at a 1% level

Table 17: Ethnic bias' impact on the probability of voting for ethnicity-oriented parties

We also note that those who vote for EPRDF are primarily biased ethical altruists. Those who vote for Ethiopia-oriented parties are primarily unbiased ethical altruists. Those who vote for ethnicity-oriented parties (EPRDF excluded) are egoists.

We can infer an additional information by using the results of both the approval voting question and the voting question. This consists in calculating, for each type of parties, a "leverage" ratio which expresses its ability to convert approvals into real votes. We assume that this "leverage ratio" is the proportion of people who finally vote for the party among those who had previously given their approval to it. The value of the "leverage ratio" along ethical categories is reported in Table 18.

	171 obs.	Unbiased eth. altruists	Biased eth. altruists	Not eth. altruists
Ethnicity-oriented parties	0.48	0.37	0.60	0.73
EPRDF	0.83	0.70	0.90	0.74
Ethiopia-oriented parties	0.55	0.73	0.08	0.53

Table 18: Leverage ratios according to ethical categories

We note that unbiased ethical altruists, biased ethical altruists, and not ethical altruists show the highest "leverage ratio" for Ethiopia-oriented parties, EPRDF, and ethnicity-oriented parties/EPRDF respectively. One must emphasize the very low leverage index of Ethiopia-oriented parties among biased ethical altruists which confirms again their tendency to approve Ethiopia-oriented parties and EPRDF at the same time for "good conscience" reasons. It is interesting to underline the high "leverage ratio" of Ethiopia-oriented parties among unbiased ethical altruists which shows that clear-minded ethical altruism not only increases the probability to approve Ethiopia-oriented parties, but also the probability to finally vote for them.

4.3.2 The role of unbiased ethical altruism

Our objective is here to test the role of unbiased ethical altruism, and specifically its potential in reducing the probability that individuals vote for their ethnicity-oriented party rather than for Ethiopia-oriented parties. We thus study the impact of unbiased ethical altruism over the probability of voting for one of the ethnicity-oriented parties (EPRDF, AAPO, SEPDC, ONC, OLF) rather than for Ethiopia-oriented parties (EDP, EDUP and CAFPDE). The results of the probit analysis are recorded in Table 19 (the dependent variable takes the value 1 when the individual votes for one of the 5 ethnicity-oriented parties, and the value 0 when the individual votes for one of the 3 Ethiopia-oriented parties).

	Probit
constant	0.927***
unbiased eth. altruism	-1.081***

Number of obs.	153
LR chi2(n)	24.07
Prob > chi2	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1255

*significant at a 10% level

**significant at a 5% level

***significant at a 1% level

Table 19: Impact of unbiased ethical altruism on the probability of voting for ethnicity-oriented parties rather than for Ethiopia-oriented parties

Our results show that the probability of voting for an ethnicity-oriented party rather than for an Ethiopia-oriented party is 0.82 when the individual is not an unbiased ethical altruist, while it is 0.44 when the individual is an unbiased ethical altruist. In other words, being an unbiased ethical altruist decreases the probability of voting for ethnicity-oriented parties by nearly 47%. Moreover, unbiased ethical altruism enables to reverse individuals' vote since the probability of voting for an ethnicity oriented party is greater than the probability of voting for an Ethiopia-oriented party when one is egoist, and reversely when one is unbiased ethical altruist. Such a finding thus not only clearly establishes the existence of ethical altruism in individuals' vote, but also his determinant impact on people's final choice.

4.3.3 The determinants of unbiased ethical altruism

As already emphasized, we expect that unbiased ethical altruism increases with income since it may be considered as a "luxury" good (see Margolis, 1984). Moreover, it should depend negatively on the belonging to Tigrean and Oromo ethnic group. Indeed, there is a blatant perception bias among Tigreans. Moreover, for both of these ethnic groups, being ethical altruist is very costly. On the contrary, the belonging to Amhara ethnic group may be positively correlated with this altruistic variable since the sacrifice of being ethical altruist is smaller for them, as already mentioned.

We create an "income" variable that takes the value 1 if the monthly household income is under 300 Birrs, 2 if it stands between 300 and 600 Birrs, and 3 if it is above 600 Birrs. Statistics related to Question VII.9. (see Table VII.9. in the Appendix) show the monthly income of the household in which the respondent grew up in. We notice that the income distribution among our sample roughly coincides with the urban income distribution as calculated by Bigsten and al. (2005), even though households having less than 600 Birrs/month (roughly less than 2 euros/day) are slightly underrepresented (61.7% in our sample against 70% in all urban areas and in Addis Ababa).

We implement a probit analysis where the dependent variable is the dummy "being an unbiased ethical altruist" (see Table 20). Our expectations are confirmed, with high significativity for the coefficients of the "tigrean" (which is not surprising) and "income" variables.

Dependent variable: the dummy "being an unbiased ethical altruist"	
	Probit
constant	-0.138
oromo	-0.153
tigrean	-1.031***
amhara	0.002
income	0.139**

Number of obs	282
LR chi2(n)	42.07
Prob > chi2	0.0000
Pseudo R2	0.1076

*significant at a 10% level
 **significant at a 5% level
 ***significant at a 1% level

Table 20: Determinants of the probability of unbiased ethical altruism

5 Conclusion

Our results not only demonstrate the existence of ethical altruistic voting, but also its strong impact on individuals' vote. Indeed, we show that being an ethical altruist decreases the probability of voting for ethnicity-oriented parties rather than for Ethiopia-oriented parties by nearly 47%, and more fundamentally reverses the outcome of people's vote compared to the case where they are egoists. In such a setting, while the probability of voting for an ethnicity oriented party is greater than the probability of voting for an Ethiopia-oriented party when individuals are egoists, it becomes lower when individuals are unbiased ethical altruists.

But is this finding extendable to the rest of the Ethiopian population, or, at least, to the urban Ethiopian population that, like students in this survey, are globally less exposed to EPRDF's pressures than the rural one when asked to vote for their preferred party? To know this we test the validity of the following causal relations revealed by our empirical work:

- egoistic people tend to vote for their ethnic-based party
- biased ethical altruistic people tend to vote for EPRDF
- unbiased ethical altruistic people tend to vote for Ethiopia-oriented parties.

We test these causal relations by extrapolating voting results in our sample (given its ethnic and "ethical" composition) and comparing it with the actual results. Table 21 shows the ethnic breakdown of the voters' sample (restricted to the observations for which we have information both on ethnic and ethical categories -we thus get 154 observations compared to the initial 171 ones) as well as the ethical breakdown within each ethnic group.

	Number	%
Tigreans	57	37,0
Amharas	49	31,8
Oromos	34	22,1
SNNPs	14	9,1
TOTAL	154	100,0

	TOTAL		Biased eth. altruists		Unbiased eth. altruists		Not eth. altruists	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Tigreans	57	37,0	31	64,6	10	17,5	16	32,7
Amharas	49	31,8	13	27,1	24	42,1	12	24,5
Oromos	34	22,1	3	6,3	14	24,6	17	34,7
SNNPs	14	9,1	1	2,1	9	15,8	4	8,2
TOTAL	154	100,0	48	100,0	57	100,0	49	100,0

Table 21: Breakdown of the voters' sample along ethnic and ethical lines

Using the causal relation between ethnic and ethical category and the nature of individuals' vote, we deduce voting results. Table 22 compares actual voting results with extrapolated ones and show a rather good adequation between both.

	Extrapolated %	Actual %
EPRDF	41.6	48.1
AAPO	7.8	5.2
SEPDC	2.6	1.3
Ethiopia-oriented	37.0	31.8
ONC/OLF	11.0	13.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Table 22: Comparison between actual and extrapolated voting results

This good fitting may enable us to determine whether the Addis Ababa population⁵¹ was actually motivated by ethical altruism, knowing the results of May 2005 national elections. During these elections, the two opposition coalitions won all the seats (23) dedicated to Addis Ababa at the Federal House of People’s Representatives. The first coalition was CUD (Coalition for Unity and Democracy) which gathers non ethnic opposition parties and was created under the influence of EDP and EDUP. The second coalition was UEDF (United Ethiopian Democratic Forces) which gathers ethnic-based or multi-ethnic parties like EDU, CAFPDE, AAPO, SEPDC or ONC. An egoistic voting scenario would predict that UEDF wins a large majority of the 23 seats. Yet, it is exactly the contrary that happened since CUD won 20 of the 23 seats (leaving only 3 seats to UEDF). It thus seems difficult to deny that a high proportion of voters in Addis Ababa may have been motivated, among other things, by ethical altruism.

It is clear that such a finding needs to be considered with caution since it mainly derives from observations on a very "special" population (the students of Addis Ababa University). We already mentioned that Ethiopian authorities wouldn’t have allowed us to run this survey among a sample of urban or rural households.

However, this work may at least be considered as providing a useful framework for further research aiming at testing our predictions on more representative samples in a sub-Saharan democracy ready for such field experiments. If our results are confirmed in such environments, they will have major consequences in a development perspective. Indeed, they would suggest that the politicization of ethnicity by political elites in Africa is not an irreversible tool of division and discord among citizens since they may resist it through their altruistic voting, provided the electoral process is competitive, free and fair (which was rather the case in Addis Ababa during May 2005 elections). Altruistic voting could then be integrated among the feasible policy instruments available for reaching common good. Indeed, it wipes out major sources of resentment between people by promoting equal treatment between them. This may ultimately prevent civil war from emerging in the political community and create instead a state of concord, trust, and cooperation that may be a powerful factor to economic growth and poverty reduction.

Finally, such results would further highlight the necessity to address the altruistic voting issue theoretically by introducing altruistic preferences in standard models of voting (over public good allocation, but also tax level) of the political economy that have been considering people as strictly self-interested so far.

⁵¹According to the 1994 census (see the Addis Ababa City Council website), the ethnic breakdown in Addis Ababa is as follows: 48.3% Amharas, 19.2% Oromos, 17.5% Gurage (an ethnic group from the SNNP region), 7.6% Tigreans, and 7.4% of other ethnic groups.

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7 Appendix




Figure VII.1.: Map of the Ethiopian federal states and administrative zones

Question VII.1.

Do you agree or not with the following sentences regarding politics in Ethiopia?

	Strongly agree	Rather agree	Rather disagree	Strongly disagree	I don't know/NA
a. More than 1 political party participates in elections.....					
b. Each person can freely choose who to vote for without feeling pressure.....					
c. There is no electoral fraud.....					
d. Human rights are respected.....					
e. Everybody has access to basic necessities (food, water...etc).....					
f. Everybody is protected against crime and violence.....					
g. The government treats Ethiopian people equally whatever their ethnic group, their political opinion, or their income.....					
h. Political corruption is widespread.....					

[Please place a cross in the box of your choice for each proposition]

	326 obs.		Amhara		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Rather disagree/ strongly disagree	207	63.5	104	80.0	62	89.9	28	71.8	13	14.8
Rather agree/ strongly agree	104	31.9	18	13.8	5	7.2	8	20.5	73	82.9
DK/NA or missing value	15	4.6	8	6.2	2	2.9	3	7.7	2	2.3
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.1.: Perception of inequality of treatment between Ethiopian citizens

Question VII.2.

Please read the two following statements:

Statement A: "Ethiopia is a rather unified country where federal regions may show solidarity between each other"

Statement B: "Ethiopia is a rather divided country where federal regions may enter into conflict against each other"

Which statement do you most agree with?

- Statement A
- Statement B
- I don't know or don't wish to answer

[Please circle your choice]

	326 obs.		Amhara		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Ethiopia is unified	112	34.4	30	23.0	13	18.8	12	30.8	57	64.8
Ethiopia is divided	177	54.3	89	68.5	44	63.8	24	61.5	20	22.7
DK/NA or missing value	37	11.3	11	8.5	12	17.4	3	7.7	11	12.5
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.2.: Perception of EPRDF's "divide" strategy

Question VII.3.

Which of the 3 following options do you prefer for Ethiopia?

- Ethnic federalism (a federation of ethnically-based states)
- Regional federalism (a federation of regionally-based states enabling different ethnic groups to live in the same state)
- No federalism at all

[Please circle your answer]

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans		Ethiopia is unified		Ethiopia is divided	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Ethnic federalism	47	14.4	12	9.2	18	26.1	1	2.6	16	18.2	20	17.9	19	10.7
Regional federalism	204	62.6	78	60.0	37	53.6	31	79.5	58	65.9	79	70.5	102	57.6
No federalism	71	21.8	38	29.2	13	18.9	7	17.9	13	14.8	13	11.6	54	30.5
Missing value	4	1.2	2	1.6	1	1.4	0	0.0	1	1.1	0	0.0	2	1.1
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0	112	100.0	177	100.0

Table VII.3.: Opinion on the best administrative arrangement

Question VII.4.

Do you consider that democracy is functioning well or badly in Ethiopia?

- Very well
- Quite well
- Neither well nor badly: Ethiopia is just on the road to democracy
- Badly
- Very badly
- I don't know or don't wish to answer

[Please circle your choice]

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Good democracy	60	18.4	15	11.5	5	7.2	3	7.7	37	42.0
Democratisation process	137	42.0	51	39.2	17	24.6	26	66.7	43	48.9
Bad democracy	120	36.8	59	45.4	44	63.8	10	25.6	7	8.0
DK/NA or missing value	9	2.8	5	3.8	3	4.3	0	0.0	1	1.1
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.4.a.: Perception of the quality of democracy I (Question VII.4.)

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Competitive elections										
Rather disagree/ strongly disagree	74	22.7	31	23.8	25	36.2	5	12.8	13	14.8
Rather agree/ strongly agree	239	73.3	93	71.5	39	56.5	32	82.1	75	85.2
DK/NA or missing value	13	4.0	6	4.6	5	7.2	2	5.1	0	0.0
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0
Free elections										
Rather disagree/ strongly disagree	167	51.2	81	62.3	50	72.5	20	51.3	16	18.2
Rather agree/ strongly agree	145	44.5	43	33.1	14	20.3	17	43.6	71	80.7
DK/NA or missing value	14	4.3	6	4.6	5	7.2	2	5.1	1	1.1
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0
Fair elections										
Rather disagree/ strongly disagree	194	59.5	85	65.4	49	71.0	24	61.5	36	40.9
Rather agree/ strongly agree	72	22.1	20	15.4	6	8.7	6	15.4	40	45.5
DK/NA or missing value	60	18.4	25	19.2	14	20.3	9	23.1	12	13.6
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0
Respect of human rights										
Rather disagree/ strongly disagree	182	55.8	88	67.7	58	84.1	22	56.4	14	15.9
Rather agree/ strongly agree	126	38.7	34	26.2	6	8.7	16	41.0	70	79.5
DK/NA or missing value	18	5.5	8	6.2	5	7.2	1	2.6	4	4.5
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.4.b.: Perception of the quality of democracy II (Question VII.1.a,b,c,d)

Question VII.5.

Overall, would you say that democracy has improved or worsened in Ethiopia over the last 10 years?

- a. Improved a lot
 - b. Rather improved
 - c. Neither improved nor worsened
 - d. Rather worsened
 - e. Worsened a lot
 - f. I don't know or don't wish to answer
- [Please circle your choice]*

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Improvement	194	59.5	63	48.5	28	40.6	26	66.7	77	87.5
Stagnation	50	15.3	28	21.5	7	10.1	8	20.5	7	8.0
Worsening	74	22.7	33	25.4	32	46.4	5	12.08	4	4.5
DK/NA or missing value	8	2.5	6	4.6	2	2.9	0	0.0	0	0.0
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.5.: Perception of the democratic progress

Question VII.6.

How much do you trust the following people?

	Very much	Somewhat	Not much	Not at all	DK/ NA
a. Your relatives.....					
b. Someone in your university.....					
c. Someone in your own kebele.....					
d. Ethiopians from other kebeles.....					
e. Someone in your own ethnic group.....					
f. Ethiopians from other ethnic groups.....					

[Please place a cross in the box of your choice for each proposition]

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
People from own ethnic group										
Trust	190	58.3	67	51.5	41	59.4	22	56.4	60	68.2
No trust	108	33.1	49	37.7	25	36.2	13	33.3	21	23.8
DK/NA or missing value	28	8.6	14	10.8	3	4.4	4	10.3	7	8.0
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0
People from other ethnic groups										
Trust	131	40.2	44	33.8	24	34.8	15	38.5	48	54.5
No trust	159	48.8	72	55.4	40	58.0	18	46.1	29	33.0
DK/NA or missing value	36	11.0	14	10.8	5	7.2	6	15.4	11	12.5
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.6: Trust towards people from the same/other ethnic group(s)




Figure VII.2.: Polical landscape as perceived by Amharas




Figure VII.3.: Polical landscape as perceived by Oromos




Figure VII.4.: Polical landscape as perceived by SNNPs




Figure VII.5.: Polical landscape as perceived by Tigreans

Question VII.7.

Do you think that a different government coalition could have done better work at handling these matters [creating growth and improving people's access to education, health services...etc] than the actual one over the last 10 years?

- a. Yes, very much
- b. Yes, to some extent
- c. Rather no
- d. Not at all
- e. I don't know or don't wish to answer

[Please circle your answer]

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Credible opposition	179	54.9	75	57.7	42	60.9	21	53.8	41	46.6
No credible opposition	105	32.2	36	27.7	20	29.0	12	30.8	37	42.0
DK/NA or missing value	42	12.9	19	14.6	7	10.1	6	15.4	10	11.4
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.7.: Opinion on the credibility of opposition parties

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Bad access to basic necessities	257	78.8	107	82.3	61	88.4	31	79.5	58	65.9
Good access to basic necessities	56	17.2	16	12.3	6	8.7	6	15.4	28	31.8
DK/NA or missing value	13	4.0	7	5.4	2	2.9	2	5.1	2	2.3
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.1.e.: Perception of people's access to basic necessities

Question VII.8.

Over the last 10 years, how well would you say that government has been handling the following matters in Ethiopia? If you consider that some of these matters are not the business of government, please select "Not government's business").

	Very well	Quite well	Not well	Not well at all	Not government's business	DK/NA
a. Increasing your income.....						
b. Increasing the income of people in your kebele.....						
c. Increasing the income of all Ethiopian people.....						
d. Improving your access to education, health services, water, electricity, etc.....						
e. Improving the access of people in your kebele to education, health services, water, electricity, etc.....						
f. Improving the access of all Ethiopian people to education, health services, water, electricity, etc.....						

(Please place a cross in the box of your choice for each proposition)

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Creating growth										
Not competent	206	63.2	89	68.5	54	78.3	27	69.2	36	40.9
Competent	90	27.6	29	22.3	9	13.0	6	15.4	46	52.3
Not government's business	9	2.8	1	0.8	3	4.3	3	7.7	2	2.3
DK/NA or missing value	21	6.4	11	8.5	3	4.3	3	7.7	4	4.5
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0
Improving access to public good										
Not competent	116	35.6	54	41.5	36	52.2	14	35.9	12	13.6
Competent	202	62.0	74	56.9	30	43.5	23	59.0	75	85.2
Not government's business	2	0.6	1	0.8	1	1.4	0	0.0	0	0.0
DK/NA or missing value	6	1.8	1	0.8	2	2.9	2	5.1	1	1.1
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.8.: Perception of the incumbent's ability to create growth and increase access to public good

Question VII.9.

In which category of monthly average income is the income of your family (i.e: the household you grew up in) in today's monetary value?

- Less than 150 Birrs
- Between 150 and 300 Birrs
- Between 301 and 600 Birrs
- Between 601 and 1200 Birrs
- Between 1201 and 2000 Birrs
- Between 2001 and 3000 Birrs
- More than 3000 Birrs

[Please circle your answer]

	1997 (%)*		326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	All towns	Addis Ababa	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
0-299 Birrs	45	46	131	40.2	45	34.6	30	43.5	11	28.2	45	51.1
300-599 Birrs	25	24	70	21.5	37	28.5	12	17.4	6	15.4	15	17.0
More than 600 Birrs	30	30	124	38.0	48	36.9	27	39.1	22	56.4	27	30.7
DK/NA or missing value	0	0	1	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.1
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

*data from Bigsten and al. (2005)

Table VII.9.: Monthly income of the household the respondent grew up in

	Number				Total	% of approvals	
	Yes	No	DK/NA	Yes+No		All sample*	Yes/No**
EPRDF	41	58	31	99	130	31.5	41.4
AAPO	41	49	40	90	130	31.5	45.6
SEPDC	13	54	63	67	130	10.0	19.4
CAFPDE	39	39	52	78	130	30.0	50.0
EDP	67	22	41	89	130	51.5	75.3
EDUP	44	39	47	83	130	33.8	53.0
ONC	2	87	41	89	130	1.5	2.2
OLF	1	101	28	102	130	0.8	1.0

*the 130 respondents

**only those who answered "yes" or "no"

Table VII.10.: Approval voting results among Amharas

	Number				Total	% of approvals	
	Yes	No	DK/NA	Yes+No		All sample*	Yes/No**
EPRDF	15	40	14	55	69	21.7	27.3
AAPO	5	41	23	46	69	7.2	10.9
SEPDC	10	32	27	42	69	14.5	23.8
CAFPDE	12	32	25	44	69	17.4	27.3
EDP	22	25	22	47	69	31.9	46.8
EDUP	14	28	27	42	69	20.3	33.3
ONC	21	24	24	45	69	30.4	46.7
OLF	23	25	21	48	69	33.3	47.9

*the 69 respondents

**only those who answered "yes" or "no"

Table VII.11.: Approval voting results among Oromos

	Number				Total	% of approvals	
	Yes	No	DK/NA	Yes+No		All sample*	Yes/No**
EPRDF	11	17	11	28	39	28.2	39.3
AAPO	1	19	19	20	39	2.6	5.0
SEPDC	6	13	20	19	39	15.4	31.6
CAFPDE	9	10	20	19	39	23.1	47.4
EDP	15	8	16	23	39	38.5	65.2
EDUP	10	10	19	20	39	25.6	50.0
ONC	1	23	15	24	39	2.6	4.2
OLF	0	26	13	26	39	0.0	0.0

*the 39 respondents

**only those who answered "yes" or "no"

Table VII.12.: Approval voting results among SNNPs

	Number				Total	% of approvals	
	Yes	No	DK/NA	Yes+No		All sample*	Yes/No**
EPRDF	76	5	7	81	88	86.4	93.8
AAPO	7	48	33	55	88	8.0	12.7
SEPDC	4	45	39	49	88	4.5	8.2
CAFPDE	13	35	40	48	88	14.8	27.1
EDP	24	32	32	56	88	27.3	42.9
EDUP	16	40	32	56	88	18.2	28.6
ONC	2	58	28	60	88	2.3	3.3
OLF	0	71	17	71	88	0.0	0.0

*the 88 respondents

**only those who answered "yes" or "no"

Table VII.13.: Approval voting results among Tigreans

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
No mobilisation	39	12.0	18	13.8	5	7.2	8	20.5	8	9.1
Mobilisation	252	77.3	98	75.4	58	84.1	26	66.7	70	79.5
Missing value	35	10.7	14	10.8	6	8.7	5	12.8	10	11.4
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.14.: Breakdown of the dummy "mobilization against inequality" along ethnic lines

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Politicization	60	18.4	20	15.4	22	31.9	3	7.7	15	17.0
No politicization	264	81.0	110	84.6	46	66.7	36	92.3	72	81.8
Missing value	2	0.6	0	0.0	1	1.4	0	0.0	1	1.1
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.15.: Breakdown of the dummy "no politicization of ethnicity" along ethnic lines

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
No ethical altruism	82	25.2	28	21.5	25	36.2	9	23.1	20	22.7
Ethical altruism	207	63.5	88	67.7	37	53.6	25	64.1	57	64.8
Missing value	37	11.3	14	10.8	7	10.1	5	12.8	11	12.5
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.16.: Breakdown of the dummy "ethical altruism" along ethnic lines

	326 obs.		Amharas		Oromos		SNNPs		Tigreans	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
A unified Ethiopia: not a necessity	173	53.1	65	50.0	48	69.6	20	51.3	40	45.5
A unified Ethiopia: a necessity	149	45.7	63	48.5	20	29.0	19	48.7	47	53.4
Missing value	4	1.2	2	1.5	1	1.4	0	0.0	1	1.1
TOTAL	326	100.0	130	100.0	69	100.0	39	100.0	88	100.0

Table VII.17.: Breakdown of the dummy "Ethiopia must remain unified" along ethnic lines